FORUM: Iran Nuclear Crisis

Kourosh Zaim (Tehran) and Alastair Crooke (London)

(Sahar TV Network), Thursday March 19, 2006

Moderator: Dr. S. Mohammad Marandi

Marandi: Mr. Zaim, could you begin with a review of the background of the situation regarding the nuclear problem and a brief history of how the current debate came about? 

Zaim: Iran's been a member of the NPT since 1970 and even sighed to it in1968, 2 years, before it came to be. The NPT protocol allows members to engage in peaceful nuclear research and activity under the supervision of the IAEA. In fact, under Article 4 of the protocol, the countries that are advanced in nuclear science and technology are obligated to assist other member nations in this regards, if asked to. As far as infractions are concerned, I have reviewed violations reported by the NPT, out of some 181 members about 54 have violated the rules over the years, of which Iran's violations have not been the most serious. So, Iran's problem is not so much the nuclear activities and behavior, it lies beyond this. The other problems you hear and read about in the media.

But, as far as advancement in nuclear science and technology [is concerned], it is a national right of any member nation of the NPT. Nuclear knowledge is not just used for making weapons, not even only for power generation, but in many areas of science and industry. We have strong scientific abilities and it'd be a pity not to be able to engage in this field. 

Thirdly, we have to build, in my estimate, at least 40 to 50 nuclear power plants over the next quarter century in order to secure our future energy needs. If we had pursued the pre-1979 contracts to build them, we would've had at least 20-24 nuclear power plants by now. We must get about 20-30% of our power requirement from nuclear energy. If we're going to have power plants, then we have to have our own production of fuel. Even though it's not economical to engage in fuel production for less than five, or by some estimates ten, plants; but, eventually we are going to have more power plants and we must learn how to produce our own fuel. And, so long as it is done within the NPT guidelines and IAEA supervision, I think there is no reason why they shouldn't allow us to do it.

The problem is that we have not been prudent in our diplomacy in this crisis. We have also made many tactical mistakes since the [current] problem surfaced in 2003, specially, since we signed the Additional Protocol, but not ratified yet by the parliament. I will just mention a few of our tactical mistakes.  

One was last year when we started negotiating with the three EU countries, UK, Germany and France, which led to the Tehran Agreement with their foreign ministers. By this, we transformed a legal issue within the NPT into an international political issue. Once the problem became an international political issue, it would naturally head toward the Security Council for resolution. We should've kept it within the NPT jurisdiction. 

The second mistake we made was in the agreement we signed in Paris, again, with the same three European countries representing the EU. In that agreement, we made two errors. When we agreed to suspend the enrichment activities, the negotiators failed to put a time limit on it. In other words, the suspension was open-ended. That means, any time we do something, we would be in violation of the Agreement. The second error in that Agreement was that we didn't differentiate between the activities in Isfahan and in Natanz. The activity in Isfahan is not really of anybody's concern, because it is not enrichment. But the activity in Natanz was of concern. Our negotiators should've made the distinction when we could've easily removed Isfahn from the Agreement. It means that we could've continued research and conversion of uranium into uranium oxide without any international interference. Since then, of course, we have worsened in our diplomacy. Part of the international agreements and concerns lies in [our] diplomacy, the quality we present in our diplomacy.

Lastly, as far as Iran having nuclear weapons, in my opinion, it is not in Iran's national interest to have nuclear weapons. Once you have nuclear weapons, you have to have means of delivering it. We don't have any effective means of delivery and means of evading detection, which now can be easily done via satellite detection facilities. If you are detected early, you can be blown up before you reach target. It is not prudent and not in our national interest to develop nuclear weapons and we should be able to convince the international community that we don't intend to do so.

Marandi: Mr. Crooke, could you tell us what is currently taking place with regards to discussions in China as well as discussions between Iran and Russians and with the Security Council?

Crooke: Well, I think, let us start with the last part first. I think what we're going to be seeing as a first step in the Security Council is a presidential statement. A presidential statement is literally a form of words. It will refer to the report that has come from IAEA and with all probability will refer back to Vienna, to the IAEA, again in order to come back with further report. In other words, it will be a series of small steps. I think, when you ask what is going on in other spheres, it is difficult to be precise. I think what diplomacy is happening, it's moving now from public sphere and now very much in terms of bilateral discussions and probably to very private and quiet [discussions]. It's unlikely that we should see what's occurred there. But, certainly, after the talks in Russia, those talks which seemed to hold considerable promise indeed, both Mr. ElBaradei and, clearly, the Russian foreign minister thought there had been potential for successful resolution. After his visit to Washington, it appeared Washington unlikely to accept those proposals. So, to certain extent, that form of direct diplomacy has come to an end, and people are waiting to see what happens in the Security Council.

Marandi: Right. So, as you mentioned, it seemed to some that there may be some sort of agreement between the Iranians and Russians that would be acceptable where Iranians will be able to enrich small amounts of Uranium and Russians will produce the fuel along side and with participation of Iranians. Seemingly, Americans refused to accept it and Iranians adamant that they wouldn't back down from their positions. How do you think private discussions and diplomacy will resolve the situation?

 Crooke: Well, I'm not sure at this stage that private diplomacy can resolve the situation. Let's look a little bit at the reason for this and look behind it. I think you have to go back a few years and see what lies behind it. To the conservative thinkers in the United States, many of whom are associated with Rand Corporation, like Buttsttter and others, who strongly believed that the Nonproliferation Treaty is deeply flawed and took issue with it from the outset. They believe that any form of peaceful uranium enrichment is what they describe as loophole; a loophole through which countries can achieve nuclearization and even weaponization. I think because the same group always been adverse to the use of international organizations and trying to negotiate such treaties has been an attempt to remove these so-called loopholes by eliminating any possible form of peaceful enrichment. This is clearly in breech of NPT. So, the U.S. is trying to use its power and its political might to change the NPT without actually stating that and without actually using the international forum to come up with an agreed amendment. And, particularly, at the time when they've been using, if you like, in other places when they've breeching the Treaty, which we've seen in places like India, although it is not a signatory to the NPT, it tended to undermine the provisions of the NPT. So, I think that we're not talking about something that can be resolved within the framework of NPT, because the basis of this is to prevent any peaceful enrichment of uranium.

Marandi: OK, Mr. Zaim. The Americans are adamant, at least at this point, to prevent Iran from enriching uranium even, let's say, in limited form. What sort of policy do you think Iranian government will pursue with regard to this reality and what appears to be the American policy?

Zaim: You see, we have to face the reality. It is too late for negotiations and for making deals. We lost those opportunities long time ago. With the Board of Governors ordering Iran to suspend all enrichment activities, I think tomorrow we probably face the Security Council confirming that order. The difference between the Board of Governors and the Security Council is that the Security Council order is enforceable and must be obeyed. There is no room for negotiation.

Another thing that I think might happen is that the Security Council, either in this meeting or the next one, will force Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol, which Iran has signed, but not ratified yet. But, of course, with Iran stating for the first time that they might be ready to negotiate directly with the United States, something we've been refusing to do, even though much late in coming, it might cause the Security Council to allow more time from this session to the next session, when Iran would have a short time opportunity, probably from one month to a maximum of three months, to negotiate and find a new solution to the problem.

I think the Americans are pressing too hard for the enrichment question, and might be able to eventually succeed, but I don't think it's fair for countries that already have the facilities and have the need for enrichment for fuel processing, so long as the international community is convinced it is used for peaceful purposes and not used for weapons production. I don't think tomorrow's decision is going to leave any room for leniency.

Marandi: Well, Mr. Crooke, with regards to the statement that will probably come out the Security Council tomorrow and that Iran will probably not abide by the wishes of the Security Council, where do you think that would lead us?

Crooke: Well, I think it's right what the last commentator who was saying this is past the opportunity for negotiation. I think at this point it went to trial of strength. Quite clearly, Iran tried its best not to [let it] come to a head. I think we're seeing that in the 16^th of February when, first of all, Mr. ElBradei spoke about the possibility of limited enrichment taking place and then subsequently the reaction of that from Iran was very clear. Of which the chief negotiator of Iran said there is three routes to the solution to this. First of all to have proper process of inspection, then, perhaps, to use centrifuges that are limited in the ability and smaller in number, so there could be limited enrichment and, finally, the offer of consortium, a consortium in which international companies could take part in terms of enrichment as the final guarantee.

You would've thought this would be enough. This was clearly not enough. Only 168 centrifuges [are] clearly not enough to take up enrichment to anything as the weapons grade level. As I said, this could come across a problem in the United States as an ideological point of view. They see any enrichment, despite the fact [that] that is the basis for underlying deal in the NPT to all people peaceful use of the enrichment in return for the nuclear states eventually de-weaponizing. This original deal [is] being unilaterally changed by the application of force. So, I think, you'll see a stand-off and, I think, well, you'll see a trial. The question is how much support will then be in the Security Council for taking strong measures. I think there will be a number of member states who will be anxious to see this return to some form of negotiations and will be trying to take it back to IAEA and try to open other possibilities.

Equally, one should not be too alarmist, because whatever the rhetoric, probably, some saber rattling in going on. But, whatever rhetoric that's going on, at the moment, but the United States is aware that it probably does not have a majority in the Security Council who are looking to put sanctions on Iran, certainly, not economic sanctions. There is a poor history of economic sanctions. It's not been a successful tool. It largely has ended up with Europeans, with European companies taking the brunt. In fact, they're being sanctioned rather than the countries on which the sanctions are targeted. So, I think there will be an element of test of strength, and we will see how it goes. It may be possible that after this test of strength, we'll see whether there will be a renewed willingness for negotiated outcome.

Marandi: Well, Mr. Zaim, how about yourself? What do you think? How far do you think the Security Council will go? How far do you think the Americans can push the Security Council? 

Zaim: I think tomorrow the Security Council, in my opinion, will confirm the Board of Governors' orders.

Marandi: How about the long term?

Zaim: I'm going to get to that. Another thing I'm sure in my mind, is that in this session or the next session, will require Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol, which has not been ratified yet. After this, I think it depends on the skill of Iranian negotiators to gain trust of the international community, specially, United States which has been pushing for this sanctions and, of course, the three musketeers in Europe. And, this can be done only by high quality negotiators, not the ones we've been sending out in the past two years and specially now. Iran CAN gain permission to enrich just enough for research purposes on certain conditions, under strict NPT or IAEA supervision and it should be allowed to do depending how it behaves in the upcoming negotiations.

To solve the problem, last year, October of last year, I made the proposal of consortium. That was my proposal I made to government to ask the three European countries, Germany, France, the U.K. and the United States, to come to Iran and join in consortium for construction of power plants and also [for] the enrichment process. Of course, the proposal was pursued to some extent, but did not bear fruit. I still think the consortium route is the best way to gain trust of the international community. This will give the international community direct supervision and direct involvement in the decision-making process, and will be profitable too. I still think if they pursue this route, it might save the day.

Marandi: Alright, well, Mr. Crooke, the difference in thoughts here is that Mr. Zaim thinks Iranians should gain the trust of the Americans, where you believe it is more ideological for the Americans. This is not an issue of trust. Am I right in describing how you see it?

Crooke: Yes. I don't think it's the question of trusting Iran. They are intent on trying to change what they see as loopholes by which states can acquire enrichment. Because, they just simply believe it is an opening for countries to eventually become weaponized and, therefore, they're fundamentally trying to alter NPT. And, I think what we've seen and the question of how to approach for Iran is quite difficult in the sense that I'm not quite sure whether anyone is listening.

And, certainly, if you look at the way the United States press has actually changed in the last days, they've formed a mental line with almost no questioning and rigorous analysis of the situation, but simply has been demonizing Iran in recent period, it does not suggest that it will be an easy matter to get trust of the United States, particularly, the trust of the United States congress or public. Where I think where Iran can be successful and will be successful to pursue it, it is actually doing politics. This, I think, is slightly different from what I mean by successfully negotiating to trying to win trust of America. By doing politics, by making it clear to Europe and to other players like Russia and China that there's an opening that Iran is interested in a solution and the limited enrichment and, indeed, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty provides for it.        

Trust was the whole basis for, indeed, it is part of the NPT that other states assist in the process of peaceful nuclearization. Therefore, it's understandable that Iran wants to do that. I think, providing Iran, [as] it shows that's open to talking and it's not simply playing for time, but it's looking for positive outcomes. But, I think the response to Mr. ElBradei's initial suggestion which was quickly stamped on the United States, as was the Russian initiative which was stamped on in Washington, provide that Iran can say clearly that it's ready to talk and is open to talk, and it can try and bring other members of the Security Council to understand this is positive.

After all, the suggestion of consortium, which was referred to, I think is very strong one and I think was really a very good idea by your colleague to suggest that. Similarly, the idea of limited centrifuges that are limited in the degree they can enrich. I think these carry the force of reason. They are clearly sensible approach to the problem. The question is can they manage the politics in the Security Council in order to bring that view to prevail?

Marandi: But, don't you think the major problem is how the Europeans are positioning themselves? Because, while the Russians and the Chinese seem to be more supportive of the Iranian stand, the Europeans don't seem to be any different than Americans at this point. So, even Russian proposal or what Mr. ElBradei has proposed hasn't had a positive response from the Europeans, so far at least.

Crooke: Well, I think, a number of things are playing in Europe, and the truth is some misunderstanding. Some Europeans think the negotiation has not been well managed from the Iranian side. But, I'm sure that the Iranian negotiating team would say the same thing about the European effort. I think it's very difficult to negotiate on the Iran-Europe track when your confidence is undermined in other spheres and areas. I think that from the outset, it's been quite difficult for the Europeans trying to build confidence with Iran when, at the same time, Iranians can read in Israeli press that preparations are being made for an attack on Iran. When they can read detailed planning and coordination meetings going ahead in anticipation of the probability of an attack on Iran at the same time have the confidence growing in developing on the European track.

So, I'm not surprised at that had been difficulties. But, I think, it's very important, and Iran can find a difference, Europeans everywhere are very concerned about the growing feeling of anger and frustration throughout the Moslem world at the European policies. I think we've seen an expression of that in the cartoonist [issue]. There is a real sense of anxiety. We've seen another example [in] what happened in Jericho and Gaza and West Bank after Israel storming of the prison when the British guards walked away from [the] prison.

This anger and sense of frustration means that Europe is really is looking very closely at its policies. [It] doesn't really know what to do about this nuclear issue. Iraq, no one knows what to do about that. There is crisis in Syria, crisis in Lebanon, there is crisis in Palestine. There are problems in Egypt and in Saudi Arabia, increasingly. There is very little sense that Europe has clear answers to that. So, they're very anxious not to be dragged and pulled into something that could lead into even greater friction between Europe and the Moslem world. So, how to reconcile this and how to find way through that? I think that is something they dearly like to do. But, at the same time, they would have to argue their case in Washington and be able to mount a case that will enable another direction to be pursued. But, I think, very clearly the will on the part of Europe [is] to find a solution to this.

Marandi: Right. Mr. Zaim, how important is Iraq in all this?

Zaim: Well, it's important in the sense that it affects the overall plans Americans have in the Middle East and the greater Middle East [initiative]. I believe that now that Iran has agreed to talk directly, there are certain concerns between Iran and the United States that it's not talked about and is not as evident as the news about the nuclear crisis. If they can resolve these problems, and Americans are convinced Iran will not undermine stability in Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries, and Iran assist like we did in Afghanistan, I think a lot of fire is going to be put down between Iran and the United States. Because, if the United States hope to come out of the Iraqi fiasco and would hope to pursue the plans of democratization in the Middle East, it would need Iran's assistance, even tacit assistance.

They know Iran is probably the most important country in the region and probably the most powerful and the most influential. And, most of the countries the United States has plans for democratization and change of system, are within Iranian cultural and historical extent. In other words, they have cultural, [historical] and religious ties to Iran and the United States cannot move successfully without Iran's assistance or, at least, without assurance of not undermining. What I meant by gaining trust is this not [just] the nuclear issue. I think, deep inside, the Americans are not worried about Iran developing nuclear weapons and to be threat to the region, if they were sure that Iranian foreign policy is not to prevent stability in the neighboring countries. I think that's the point that should be stressed in the upcoming negotiations.

Marandi:  Mr. Crooke, very briefly, there has been talk about Americans and Israelis preparing attack on Iranian targets. How feasible is that? The Persian Gulf is a strategic region, Iran is a powerful country and the United States is heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan. It wouldn't simply be an attack on Iranian targets, it might have major consequences for disrupting the world economy.

Crooke: I think you're right. I mean, in fact, Iran has a strong hand to play, has a lot of cards. It can be very positive. It can assist in Iraq, and only Iran is in a position to provide that. In Afghanistan, also Iran can play a role in Palestine. I think the problem, up to now, is that the United States only deals with issues on compartmental basis. In other words, we'd only deal with nuclear issue and the Iraq issue, but not address the overall relationship between United States and Iran. And, I think Iran has [been] pressing hard to have full parley and discussion of all the elements that go back that may be help conflicts relationship between the United States and Iran. Whether it's in the interest of the United States to do that, particularly, now leading up to U.S. elections, I really can't tell. I don't know the risks necessarily. I think it is right that it's possible to play this quite carefully. I think it needs quite careful understanding of how to play it both in the European public sphere and in the European media. In order to give the sense of risk that will follow confrontation or worsening of the situation. Iran has a positive aspect. Iran has a positive role to play.

Marandi: We are out of time. Hopefully, we discuss this again in future. I would like to thank Mr. Alastair Crooke and Dr. Kourosh Zaim for being with us tonight. Good night.