کودتا و کاشانی

گزیده و گزارشی از استاد جدید منتشرشده از سوی سازمان اطلاعات مرکزی آمریکا درباره کودتا 28 مرداد 1332 با تأکید بر نقش کاشانی

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مقدمه

گروهی کم ویش پذیرفته شده است که آمریکا نقش فعالی در سرنگونی دولت دکتر محمد صدق داشت، اما با توجه به عدم انتشار کامل استاد مربوط به این واقعه در سال‌های گذشته، اگر و اثباتی درباره چگونگی دخالت آمریکا مطرح شده بود. اسناد منتشر شده سیستم مؤید طرح ریزی کودتا نیست، بلکه آراکس علیه دولت مصداق در روز 25 مرداد 1332‌بود، که با همکاری مصدق نام ماند. عدم انتشار استاد مربوط به وقایع 28 مرداد موجب شده بود گمان‌هایی مطرح شد.

بررسی استاد تازه نشان می‌دهد که بر خلاف تحلیل‌های خان و ضد کودتا، کودتا 28 مرداد با برنامه‌ریزی سازمان سیا و از طریق عوامل داخلی هم‌چون کاشانی، اوباش تهران و بخشی از ارتش وفادار به شاه صورت گرفته است و خود آمریکا/ها از این واقعه به عنوان «کودتا» یاد کرده‌اند. نکته بسیار مهم و مشکوک در این مجموعه استاد سکت مطلق درباره کاشانی در فاصله کمی بیش از اجرای کودتا 25 مرداد 1332 تا پایان استاد است: کاشانی تا پیش از اجرای کودتا نقش و موقعیت ویژه‌ای در استاد دارد و بارها از نام برده‌می‌شود، اما از کمی بیش از اجرای کودتا 25 مرداد تا پایان استاد تقی‌ترین هیچ خبری از ندارم. این نکته به تنهایی بسیار قابل تأمل است. نکته مهم دیگر آن است که آمریکا/ها با گذشت بیش از 60 سال از کودتا هم چنان نامه‌های بسیاری را از طبقه‌بندی خارج نگرداند. چه با افسای نام این افراد می‌توانست در نتیجه گیری از این استاد اثرگذار باشد.

استاد

مجموعه استاد منتشر شده شامل 1000 صفحه است که نام کاشانی 476 بار در آن تکرار شده است. می‌تواند بررسی‌های سیاسی را که از کاشانی در آنها نام برده شده بررسی کردم و نکاتی را که به نظرم مهم آمد، برای شما می‌نویسم. امیدوارم این ارژیای اولیه مفید باشد. شایان توجه است، ترجومه این پیش‌بینی دقیق نیست و فقط مفاهیم اصلی ترجومه شده‌اند. در برخی فقرات طولانی و مهم یا غیرمرتبط با موضوع کاشانی، به آوردن متن اصلی اکتفا شده و با رنگ قرمز برخی موضوع مهم مشخص شده است.
"Efforts should also be made to buy off Kashani. It would appear that at heart Kashani is primarily interested in himself rather than being inspired by a crusading zeal, and there have been indications that his attitude toward the US can be influenced by money."

"باید تلاش کنیم کاشانی را بخریم. به نظر می‌رسد کاشانی در باطن بیشتر به خودش فکر می‌کند، تا مبارزه و نشانه‌هایی وجود دارد مبنی بر آن که می‌شود تگرش او را نسبت به آمریکا با پول تغییر داد."

"Use of clandestine publications to expose the Soviet ties of Hosein Makki, Sayyid Sbol Hazan Haerizadeh, and possibly Ibol Qader Azad."

"Attempts to split off such of his more stable and reasonable followers as Dr. Mozafar Boghai and Illahyer Saleh by demonstrating the general disorder and anarchy which this group is fostering."

"At the moment, the popular issue—which he helped make popular and which he is now exploiting to his advantage—is that of oil nationalization."

"At the moment, the popular issue—which he helped make popular and which he is now exploiting to his advantage—is that of oil nationalization."
43. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
No. 224 Tehran, August 20, 1951.

RECENT INCREASE IN POLITICAL PRESTIGE OF AYATOLLAH KASHANI

"Following the advent of World War II and the abdication of Reza Shah, Kashani again took up the task of opposing British activities. When the Allies occupied Iran, the British promptly imprisoned him in spite of objections raised by the then U.S. Minister, Dreyfus. His relative partiality to the U.S. dates from that time."

"Sabileh Rowbat Kasani ba Amerika
Rowbat Amerika ba Kasaniye be Zaman beri gerdad ke ps az Khatere gerye Rashashah, ao Ullrugh Moxidat Amerikaye ha as Suwi Britaniya Zendani Shad."

"Even Dr. Mosadeq, who enjoys the unanimous support of the people, if he deviated from the nine article law, risks losing not only his prestige but also risks suffering the same fate as Razmara".

"Hatih Moxdeq Hem ke az jamiat berxodar asta aghahad az Qanoun 9 Madadai serpipeh Kond, astarbaras ra az desti Midehao be lileh memkon ast plaibo ke Sery Ramdo Amdo Sery ao Hem Bias."
RECENT INCREASE IN POLITICAL PRESTIGE OF AYATOLLAH KASHANI

"Conclusion:
In Kashani’s career there is a thin thread of consistency. Through-out, he has opposed British interference in Iranian affairs. The consistency ends there, except perhaps for his opportunism. CAS reports that he can be bribed. He has at least on one occasion made overtures to the American Embassy here for financial support in return for which, presumably, he would support United States policies."

43. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
No. 224 Tehran, August 20, 1951.
RECENT INCREASE IN POLITICAL PRESTIGE OF AYATOLLAH KASHANI

"He has fantastic delusions of grandeur which until recently had little basis in fact. Events, however, have moved in his favor. His political stature has been inflated by the publicity accorded him in the foreign press and the prestige given him by the fact that Mr. Harriman and Mr. Stokes called on him. Their interviews have been exploited to the maximum by Kashani. Although his stature has grown over the last few months, Kashani has not attained the overwhelming influence which he believes he has and which he would have others believe he has. Despite his present prominence in Iranian political affairs, there is no doubt that his pretensions vastly exceed his capabilities. As has been pointed out that prominence came about by circumstances having but a fortuitous relationship with his character and less with any personal political convictions.
There is, therefore, little basis for it. He would fall from his relatively influential position as soon as its thin props were removed. His reputation as a religious leader is not supported by his colleagues whose influence in educated circles far exceed that of Kashani.
While his bombast and threats are effective in the current tense atmosphere, he probably would fail to withstand a determined attack against him by any government with the support of reputable religious leaders who would expose the shallowness of the man and the exaggerated character of his pretensions.

For the Ambassador:

Arthur L. Richards
Counselor of Embassy"
"Also, he is a friend of Kashani."

"[Qavam] He told Shah that in any event he might find it necessary arrest Kashani in view latter’s open incitement to rebellion. Shah had hesitated and had said he must examine constitutional aspects problem. Qavam had thereupon informed Shah that unless he cld be given free hand in this emergency by Shah, he wld be compelled to submit his resignation."

Kashani not fully satisfied with his present already powerful position and is clearly trying undermine influence other rival leaders and make himself complete master of Natl Front and Iran."
115. Memorandum From the Director of the U.S. Technical Cooperation Administration Mission in Iran (Warne) to the Ambassador to Iran (Henderson) Tehran, August 12, 1952.

My visit with Seyed Abdol Ayatollah Kashani

"He said he would give his life for his country"

"As we talked, Ayatollah Kashani said he hoped that Point 4, the programs of which I had carefully explained to him from A to Z, would do something "Really substantial" for Iran. He thought a big dam in the river near Isfahan and a dam on the Karun would be good ideas and would meet his specifications."

"Mr. Kashani added that communism was the worst enemy of Iran and that to stop communism the present deplorable condition of the people should be improved. A hungry person will not go after moral values and religion.” At another point Mr. Kashani referred to his dislike of the British and his equal dislike of the Russians. He said he would like to see the friendship between Iran and the United States strengthened in order that Iran might be better able to resist communism. I said that our program was not “anti-communist” but was a constructive program to help Iran help herself. I said I did not wake up each morning thinking, “How can I fight communism?” but I woke up each morning thinking, “How can I assist in fighting the diseases, hunger, and poverty that plague the people of Iran?” I said that if this was an attack on the roots of communism then communism was a diseased plant and ought to be rooted out. Kashani said he was devoted to the welfare of the people, and he thought substantial programs of improvement were needed because the people were sick and hungry."
کاشانی: بدرتنین دشمن ایران کمونیسم است و کمونیسم زمانی متوقف می‌شود که مردم ایران در رفاه باشند و مشکلی نداشته باشند. من انگلیس‌ها و روس‌ها را دوست ندارم. اگر ایران در برابر کمونیسم مقاومت کند، به دوستی خوب برای آمریکا بدل خواهد شد.

کاشانی: من خودم را وقف رفاه و آسایش مردم کرده‌ام. کاشانی در این دیدار به نماینده آمریکا از ضرورت اصلاحات ساختاری و اساسی برای پیشرفت ایران سخن می‌گوید، زیرا از نگاه او مردم ایران مريض و گرسته هستند.

نکته قابل تأمل در این دیدار، حضور پسران آیت‌الله کاشانی است. اردشیر زاهدی هم به عنوان مترجم در این دیدار حضور دارد.

ص ۳۱

"As I left, he again mentioned the need of the people of Javadeyeh, which is close to the railroad station south of Tehran, for drinking water."

در پایان این دیدار کاشانی از ویلیام وارن، نماینده اصل ۴ آمریکا در ایران خواست تا فکری برای آب آشامیدنی مردم جوادیه از محله‌های فقیرنشین جنوب تهران کند.

برنامه‌ریزی کاشانی برای سرنگون کردن دولت مصدق

ص ۳۳۶ استاد از گزارش زیر (صفحه آغاز گزارش: ۱۳ اسفند ۱۳۲۱): [۱۴ شهریور ۱۳۳۶]

120. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence Agency

Tehran, September 5, 1952, 1143Z.

"1. During latter part August source was told separately by [1½ lines not declassified] that Kashani definitely planning Mossadegh overthrow. These [less than 1 line not declassified] individuals who currently cooperating with Kashani are themselves involved in plan.

2. Timing of plan not known by source although it believed to be scheduled shortly after Kashani’s return to Iran."

"منظور داخلي ناشی از اسامی از سوی سیا حذف شده است،" گزارش کرده‌اند که کاشانی در حال برنامه‌ریزی برای سرنگون کردن مصدق است. این افراد که خود دست‌اندرکار این برنامه هستند می‌گویند چه‌طور مدت کوتاهی پس از بازگشت کاشانی از سفر حج، این برنامه عملی خواهد شد."

ص ۸
122. Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division (Leavitt) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)

SUBJECT: Program to Support the Shah

Washington, September 22, 1952

"7. Covert Support for the Shah’s Program:
(a) The foregoing program conducted by the Shah should be supplemented by a covert CIA program. Every effort should be made [1½ lines not declassified] to increase the Shah’s popularity and prestige and to reduce the influence of such leaders as Kashani, Makki, and Mossadeq. Part of this program will have to be carefully timed since it would be dangerous to reduce influence of Mossadeq before making fairly certain that the Shah’s program was proving successful."

シャアعات درباره همکاری کاشانی با حزب توده

124. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, September 28, 1952

"1309. 1. Rumors unconfirmed but nevertheless disquieting since some of them appear fairly circumstantial continue to circulate regrowing cooperation between Kashani and Tudeh. Yesterday afternoon we were informed by one source that 90 minutes previously long negotiation between Kashani–Tudeh had come successful conclusion."

تلاش کاشانی برای سرنگون کردن دولت مصدق و روی کار آوردن فضل الله زاهدی
"In telegram TEHE 152 to CIA, September 26, [1952] the Station in Tehran reported that Kashani now planned to attempt the overthrow of Mosadeq and to replace him with General Fazlullah Zahedi. The Station reported further that "Kashani since return from Mecca has met frequently with Mossadeq opposition leaders and has been successful in getting their backing against Mossadeq. Kashani has given certain promises to them that he will not adopt hostile attitude toward them or Shah. In source opinion, Mossadeq opposition motivated mainly by desperation and following reasoning. (1) Kashani only person capable of ousting Mossadeq. (2) They can either do business with Kashani or at least latter would represent force easier to cope with than that of Mossadeq.”

127. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence Agency
Tehran, October 2, 1952, 0824Z.

"1. It is being rumored Tehran that an agreement has been reached between Kashani and Tudeh to bring in Kashani or Kashani puppet as premier in place Mohammed Mossadegh possibly within next 30 days."

132. Special Estimate
SE–33 Washington, October 14, 1952.
PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF MOSSADEQ REGIME IN IRAN

"6. Since Mossadeq’s return to power in July 1952 there have been continuous reports of plots to overthrow him. Kashani and Army officers are frequently mentioned as leaders, but the reports conflict on matters of essential detail. It does not seem likely that Kashani will seek to replace Mossadeq so long as no clear issues of disagreement arise between them, so long as his influence on Mossadeq remains strong, and so long as Mossadeq is willing to assume responsibility."

"volved at the time the rioting broke out. If there should be a break now between Mossadeq and Kashani, we believe that Mossadeq could rally greater forces than Kashani."

"c. A deal with the Tudeh Party by which Tudeh was given representation in the government... If Kashani should come to power, the probable net result in Iran would be a situation worse for Western interests than the current one. the regime would be more difficult than the present one to deal with on the oil dispute and more resistant to all Western influence."
"3. When I asked him what kind help he needed he said he was not asking for money. What he wanted was for US to come out openly against imperialism and colonialism as it had come out against communism."

"If US should remain silent in face of imperialistic and colonial policies of UK and France, opponents of imperialism and colonialism could only draw inference that US was partner of imperialist and colonial powers."

143. National Intelligence Estimate
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN THROUGH 1953
"Mossadeq has been under growing pressure from extremists such as Kashani who maintain that Iran’s oil resources are a curse rather than a blessing and that Iran should reorganize its economy to avoid dependence on oil revenues."

"Mullah Kashani, president of the Majlis, seemed pleased when Minister of Court Ala informed him of Mossadeq’s threat to resign. Kashani appears ready to line-up with the Court but such a maneuver would deprive him of extremist support, notably Tudeh. Despite Kashani’s assertion that the Majlis would support the Shah if Mossadeq were to attack him, the Prime Minister reportedly feels confident that he can handle the mullah."
"CIA has also engaged in operations against the Nationalist leader, Kashani, and has tried to provoke him into taking a stand for or against the Tudeh Party."

"Mullah Kashani has been a key figure in promoting the pro-Shah street demonstrations. He has also led Parliament’s attack on Mossadeq. If Mossadeq were to disappear, Kashani would be a serious contender for his position. Although personally not acceptable to the Shah, the latter would be inclined to appoint him prime minister if recommended by Parliament. Kashani, with a record of venality, would bring a large degree of opportunism to the government. He has consistently followed a policy of extreme nationalism antagonistic to the U.S. If he succeeded Mossadeq, he would have a much narrower basis of support than Mossadeq enjoyed before the current crisis and would, therefore, be likely to resort to ruthlessness to destroy opposition. In his struggle to do so Tudeh influence and opportunities for gaining control would increase rapidly."

Planning and Implementation of Operation TPAJAX, March–August 1953

169. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Eisenhower
Washington, March 1, 1953

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160. Memorandum for the Record Prepared in the Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

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169. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Eisenhower
Washington, March 1, 1953
181. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
No. 1378 Washington, March 31, 1953.
IRAN: POTENTIAL CHARACTER OF A KASHANI-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT

"The displacement of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosadeq of Iran by his nearest political rival, Mullah Abol Qasem Kashani, would be disadvantageous to Western interests. Both Kashani and Mosadeq are political opportunists, but whereas Mosadeq, despite his passionate nationalism, has an underlying respect for certain aspects of Western liberalism, Kashani views contemporary problems from a narrowly Moslem outlook, severely warped by many years of bitter conflict with British authority.

Kashani’s Potentialities for Gaining Power
Mosadeq’s prestige and political skill virtually preclude Kashani from coming to power as long as the incumbent Prime Minister is alive and politically active. Should Mosadeq retire or die, however, Kashani would be the leading contender for his mantle, since he has the largest bloc of votes (after Mosadeq) in the Majlis and controls the largest potential force, except for Tudeh, for public demonstrations and physical intimidation of his opposition. Power to choose the Prime Minister resides in the Majlis, and it is very unlikely that the Shah would risk another “Qavam incident” by appointing as Prime Minister anyone who did not have controlling Majlis support. Despite these initial elements of strength, the succession of Kashani cannot be regarded as a cut-and-dried proposition. His election as president of the Majlis despite Mosadeq’s disapproval was the result
of a tactical maneuver of the moment, and provides no assurance that the Majlis would support Kashani for Prime Minister. Opposition to the Mullah, which would be formidable, would arise from the following considerations: (1) his personal conceit and ambition for power, which discourage cooperation; (2) doubts of the genuineness of his professed interest in social and political reform; (3) his well-known record for unscrupulousness and opportunism; (4) his open antagonism toward the Shah and the army; (5) his outspoken support of various bigoted practices; (6) his lack of business experience; and (7) his lack of executive experience at any level of government. Should he gain power his tenure might well be short, especially if his resort to violent methods should result in his own assassination. One other alternative must be considered, and that is the very real possibility that Kashani does not want the responsibility of being Prime Minister. He would probably prefer the power without the office, and may actually envisage himself as president or titular head of an Iranian republic.

What Is Kashani’s Appeal?
Kashani’s support derives from two factors: (1) political and religious emotion, and (2) material self-interest. Since World War I, when his father lost his life allegedly as a result of British action in Iraq and when Kashani participated in the declaration of Jihad (Holy War) against the Allies, he has been in frequent bitter clashes with British authority. During World War II he was interned by the British Army. This record of suffering at British hands has made Kashani a popular hero—a veteran in the fight against “imperialism” imposed by nations not only foreign, but Christian. He has used this religious factor effectively to stir up political support from pious figures throughout Iranian society. He has also secured support by providing employment or material advantages for followers. His political and philanthropic activities require considerable funds. Reports that he receives contributions from Iranians of all classes for favors promised or received are undoubtedly true. But it is significant that this is a usual Iranian practice to which no stigma is attached. Kashani has—like Mosadeq—built his political career on opportunism, i.e., by taking advantage of developments for which he was not primarily responsible. The most important of these, of course, was the growing resentment of foreign interference and pressure in Iran during and following the 1941–46 Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran. Kashani did not lead the move to oust the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but once it was underway he made tremendous personal capital out of it. In building his political power, Kashani has taken full advantage of his unusual
theatrical talents, displaying exceptional skill in exploiting the rural contacts and the self-interest of the Iranian clergy, and appealing to the piety of small merchants in urban centers. He has not hesitated to use his position as a member of the Moslem clergy to arouse latent suspicions of the Christian West, and many of his political activities have followed the pattern of a ward boss, and sometimes even that of a gangster. The political supporters of Kashani and Mosadeq—as well as those of the Communist-dominated Tudeh Party—are drawn from much the same social groups. The Mosadeq–Kashani followers constitute the socialistically-inclined National Front group which became politically vocal in 1950 and which derives its strength from government workers, skilled labor, small property owners, teachers, students, and some clerics. Its concentration is greatest in urban areas where problems of organization and communication are relatively easy. Adherents who are religiously inclined tend to turn to Kashani for guidance. On the other hand, the aristocrats and the Western-educated youth who form the hard core of the National Front, in general, prefer Mosadeq. Mosadeq’s advantage lies in his integrity, his current control of the government organization, and his political astuteness. Aside from Mosadeq, the only other National Front leader whose prestige approaches that of Kashani is Allahyar Saleh, currently Iranian Ambassador to the US.

Kashani’s major domestic political targets are the Court, the army, and more recently, Mosadeq. His resentment toward the Court probably arises from (1) the ruthless destruction of the clergy’s power by the late Reza Shah; (2) a belief that the present Shah is dominated by British-oriented advisers; and (3) resentment that a man of the Shah’s non-religious character should be the titular defender and propagator of the Shia Faith of Islam. His resentment toward the army probably arises from (1) the army’s role as the instrument of Reza Shah’s domination, and (2) the manhandling which Kashani received at the hands of army officers following his arrest and exile at the time of the attempted assassination of the Shah in February 1947 [1949]. Kashani’s present opposition to Mosadeq appears to stem from personal pique that Mosadeq is not more amenable to persuasion or direction from Kashani in appointments and policies. Kashani is also jealous of Mosadeq’s justifiably higher reputation for integrity, and his better domestic and foreign press. Kashani’s present tactics against Mosadeq seem designed more to embarrass the Prime Minister and “cut him down to size” than to strengthen the Shah or bring about Mosadeq’s replacement as Prime Minister.

**Probable Policies of a Kashani-Dominated Government**
A government under Kashani’s domination would be likely to pursue the present policies of the National Front, though with increased use of violence and even assassination to control the opposition and a more open distribution of political spoils. Unless Kashani could establish an immediate dictatorship—and there are no indications at present that he has that capability—his freedom of action would be severely limited by his need for political allies. Since Kashani would not enjoy the popular confidence and prestige accorded Mosadeq, his need for support would be greater, and the obligation to use force more compelling.

The Kashani and ex-Mosadeq forces would probably unite in the face of any serious threat from either the Court or the Tudeh Party. Kashani’s potential opponents, including the army, are likely to be disunited and to calculate that their chances for survival would be greater as a result of negotiation with Kashani than if they joined the Court or Tudeh in open opposition. His opposition probably would be strong enough to force Kashani to carry out minimum social, economic, and political improvements and prevent him from implementing any inclination to transform Iran into a theocratic state.

Kashani has strongly supported the following basic National Front policies: (1) nationalization of the oil industry; (2) elimination of British influence in Iran; and (3) replacement of the political power of the traditional governing groups by that of the “people” expressed through a “truly national” Majlis. He has also adhered to the National Front and Tudeh propaganda line that all Great Powers, but especially the US and the UK, (1) follow imperialistic policies, (2) conspire with one another against weak nations, (3) control international organizations for imperialistic purposes, and (4) pursue a foreign policy toward weak nations which is not endorsed by their own public opinion. On two themes, Kashani has gone much further than Mosadeq. He has from the beginning asserted that the exploitation of Iran’s oil resources was a national curse rather than a blessing because of the extent to which revenues from the AIOC affected the Iranian economy and government operations, plus the fact that control of the AIOC was in foreign hands. He has therefore urged that Iran forget its oil resources and develop a self-sustaining economy and governmental structure not dependent on them. Secondly, Kashani—unlike Mosadeq—advocates violent means, including demonstrations and political assassination, to free Iran from the grip of those leaders—such as the assassinated Prime Minister Ali Razmara—whom Kashani regards as traitors responsive to foreign influence.

**Attitude toward the West**
There is no convincing evidence that Kashani has (1) sought substantial foreign aid in his quest for power, (2) received substantial foreign aid from any source, or (3) if he did so, either could or would carry out any commitments he might make as a quid pro quo. In the current power struggle in Iran, public knowledge of any acceptance of aid either from the West or the Soviet bloc would rapidly destroy Kashani’s power, and the likelihood that such assistance could be concealed in a society such as Iran’s is practically nil. Furthermore, it appears improbable that Kashani needs at this time the type of aid which any foreign source could supply. The instruments Kashani must deal with are Moslem and Iranian, all intensely nationalistic and therefore anxious to avoid the charge of subservience to any foreign power.

In view of Kashani’s convictions and aspirations, as well as the political forces which would limit his freedom of action, there are no grounds for believing that he could or would wish to promote closer relations between Iran and the UK except if accompanied by further British surrender of power or prestige. Insofar as he regarded US activities as attempts to restore or replace British activities, he would be likely to oppose them. At the same time, he would probably try to maintain friendly relations with the US Government and Americans and to seek US technical and economic assistance if available without unacceptable political strings. However, Kashani would probably regard any foreign efforts to further his political or personal ambitions as motivated only by self-interest, therefore requiring no quid pro quo on his part.

There is no likelihood that a government dominated by Kashani would abandon the current Iranian policy of neutrality in the East-West struggle. A Kashani government might attempt to establish a strong neutral Moslem bloc. Under his guidance, Iranian relations with Turkey and Iraq would not improve as long as Western influence remains strong in these two countries."
"In reply to a question by Ambassador Henderson, Ala said that Kashani supported Zahedi but, as with Maki, he hesitated to go all out. While giving lip service, both appeared to prefer to maintain a position which would allow them to plead non-involvement should the attempt to overthrow Mossadeq by peaceful or other means fail. Ala said he intended to see Kashani later in the day in an effort to persuade him to take a more forthright position."

191. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
CS–7704 Washington, April 16, 1953
2. On 15 April a Court representative attempted to enlist Mullah Kashani’s support of the following plan (to which the Shah “appeared favorably disposed”) to oust Prime Minister Mossadeq and replace him by General Fazullah Zahedi:

a. Kashani would address a letter to the Shah stating that, in view of the lawless condition in Tehran and threats to the Majlis deputies, the Majlis no longer could function...

3. Kashani preferred a variation of the above plan, by which he, Kashani, would draft a letter to be signed by Majlis members as well as by himself. Kashani claimed that he could obtain signatures of “possibly forty deputies” before the Government could demand a parliamentary showdown of the Committee of Eight.”
he is not interested in becoming Prime Minister himself, but in directing a successor to Mossadeq. Kashani’s power is not that of a spiritual leader, but of a schemer who can obtain the funds necessary to call out mobs from the bazaar section of Tehran. To date these mobs have not been as effective as the groups mustered by either Mossadeq or the Tudeh Party."

SUBJECT: Zahedi Campaign to Replace Prime Minister Mossadeq

"3. On 22 April 1953 the Shah received Mustafa Kashani, the son of Mullah Kashani, who urged the Shah to take action “now,” thereby capitalizing on public concern over the disappearance of Chief of Police General Mahmud Afshartus.
4. The Shah told Mustafa Kashani to wait “two days—not two weeks or two months, but only two days.”

219. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Tehran, June 19, 1953, noon.
"4684. Last night Dr. Gholam Mosadeq, son Prime Minister, told First Secretary Melbourne that week ago his father had received confirmatory evidence that large sum of money, some 400,000 rials, was being expended by opposition elements led by Kashani. This sum had been used to establish group new opposition newspapers and for other activities. Government had traced source of funds to Shah and court circles thus giving Prime Minister impression Shah’s duplicity."

4686. اشب گذشته غلام مصدق، پسر مصطفی با منشی اول روزنامه که در روزنامه‌ای که او نوشت وجود داشت، گفت‌وگو با ملاقات، ملی‌ترهای معطاء، ستیزی که هفته پیش پدرش مدرکی دال بر توزیع ۴۰ هزار تومان پول بین مخالفان به هرچه کسانی یافته است. این مبلغ برای تأسیس گروه‌های جدید، روزنامه‌های تازه و دیگر تعالیات، استفاده شده است. دولت توانسته ردعول را تا شاه و حلقهٔ اولری بگیرد. پدرم سخت از دوروبی شاه یک گاه خورده است.

کتابخانه تخصصی جامعه شناسی نامه، جزوکتاب، مقاله، پایان

275. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: The Iranian Situation
Washington, August 17, 1953

"1. The unsuccessful attempt to remove Mossadeq from power this weekend, culminating in the flight of the Shah to Iraq, greatly advances the progressive deterioration of political stability in Iran.  
2. On the one hand, Mossadeq’s numerous non-Communist opponents have been dealt an almost crippling blow and may never again be in a position to make a serious attempt to overthrow him. The chief figures in the attempt to oust Mossadeq are already in jail or in hiding, thus at least temporarily eliminating or neutralizing the most vigorous of these opponents. Even more important, the Shah’s flight—a move which may well be followed by the appointment of a regency council and may even lead to designation of a new Shah or abolition of the monarchy—greatly weakens the ability of Mossadeq’s opponents to combine against him in the future. The withdrawal of the Shah from Iranian soil not only deprives the opposition of a central figure about which it could rally but also eliminates virtually all hope that the considerable prestige and authority of the monarchy could be used to secure the necessary cooperation of the security
forces and reassure the public in any future effort to oust Mossadeq. Except in the unlikely event that a strong and resolute opposition majority develops in some future Majlis, any future attempt to unseat Mossadeq will necessarily be an out-and-out coup, without legal sanction.

3. On the other hand, Mossadeq’s position will remain basically precarious, despite the temporary advantages which he will obtain from the failure of the attempt to unseat him and from the repressive measures he is likely to undertake to consolidate his victory. The events of the weekend are unlikely to provoke any great revival of enthusiasm for Mossadeq himself, and in any event his probable continued failure to solve the basic economic and social problems facing Iran will result in a slow but steady drain on his popular support. While Mossadeq will probably make greater use of authoritarian methods, he shows little promise of being able to eliminate all opposition. If Mossadeq goes through with new Majlis elections, as appears likely, his prestige plus his ability to rig the balloting will probably enable him to obtain a majority. However, he is likely to be little more successful than in the past in finding men who will stand by him once they are elected.

4. Thus the ultimate beneficiary of the failure to unseat Mossadeq is most likely to be the Tudeh Party which has regarded the neutralization of the “counterrevolutionary” forces around the Shah as a primary objective and which has also capitalized on the widening popular unrest and insecurity which has been developing under Mossadeq. Although Mossadeq’s reassertion of his authority makes it less likely that he will have to make important concessions to Tudeh to stay in office, Tudeh is not yet ready to seize control and will probably feel compelled to confine itself to pressure group tactics for the next few months. Nevertheless, Tudeh is at present the only remaining major contender for Mossadeq’s power, and as the deterioration of the political and economic situation in Iran progresses its capabilities for an eventual showdown with Mossadeq will continue to grow. In the event of Mossadeq’s death, Tudeh might well be able to capitalize on the confusion which would probably result and to gain control at least in Tehran.

5. Mossadeq’s innate suspiciousness, which has probably been reinforced by the events of the weekend, may lead him to link the attempt to unseat him with the recent hardening of US policy toward him and to represent the attempt as an “imperialist” plot engineered by the US and UK. Even if Mossadeq convinces himself that the US is involved, however, we believe that he is likely to stop short of provoking an open break with the US. He will probably still feel the need of the
US as a counterweight to the USSR, with which an attempt to settle outstanding problems is now under way. Moreover, he has long believed that if he held on long enough and thus proved that he was the man to deal with, fear of Communism would eventually force the US to come to his help. With his control newly reconfirmed and the opposition seriously weakened, Mossadegh probably believes that this concept is more valid than ever. Although he will probably criticize and seek to embarrass the US, his main object will probably be that of forcing the US to assist him on his terms."

280. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Tehran, August 18, 1953, 10 p.m

"384. 1. My talk with Mosadeq this evening lasted one hour. He received me fully dressed (not pajama clad) as though for ceremonial occasion. He was as usual courteous but I could detect in attitude certain amount smoldering resentment. Usual exchange amenities after which I expressed sorrow at chain events since my departure over two months ago, adding I sorry see Iran apparently even worse off politically and economically than it was then. He acknowledged my statement with sarcastic smile and there lull in conversation.
2. I remarked I particularly concerned increasing number attacks on American citizens. After Shiraz incident he had issued instructions to law enforcement agencies which had afforded high degree protection to American nationals. Unfortunately law enforcement agencies appeared again to be becoming lax. Every hour or two I receiving additional reports attacks on American citizens not only in Tehran but also other localities.
3. He said these attacks almost inevitable. Iranian people thought Americans were disagreeing with them and, therefore, were attacking Americans. I said disagreements no reason for attacks. He replied Iran in throes revolution and in revolutionary stress and strain it would require three times as many police as exist to afford full protection to American citizens. I should remember that in American Revolutionary times when Americans wanted British out, many Britishers in US were attacked. I said if Iranians wanted Americans out individual attacks not necessary. We would go en masse. He said Iranian Government did not want Americans leave but some individual Iranians did and, therefore, were
attacking them. I replied Chiefs of American military mission, American gendarme’s mission, and TCI had informed me today that Iranian officials with whom they dealt had assured them they were anxious that these missions continue to function in Iran. These missions could be assured of maximum cooperation from Iranian authorities. These chiefs had also told me that at no time had they been receiving more full and effective cooperation from Iranian authorities than at present. I had refrained from informing Washington of this situation until I could talk with him. I wanted to know what his present attitude was re these American aid missions and also re giving adequate protection to members these missions. It did not make sense for certain Iranian authorities to insist that these missions remain in Iran while members of these missions were subject to insults and attacks from gangs of hoodlums.

4. Prime Minister said he sure law enforcement agencies doing all possible give protection. I disagreed and read to him excerpts various memoranda which I had received from members American aid missions during course of day, some of which indicated that police were passive while they were being attacked. He said he wished assure me that he desired aid missions to stay. He thought they were performing valuable services and would look further into matter protection of their members.

5. After another lull I told him I would be grateful if he would tell me confidentially for use my government, just what had happened during recent days. US Government interested with respect both events and legal situation. He chose interpret my remarks as reference to President’s letter to him last July. He reminded me that we had had agreement to effect existence these letters would be confidential and exchange would not be published unless US reply would be favorable. He maintained American officials either in Washington or in Tehran had directly or indirectly deliberately leaked information to pro-British Iranian press re this exchange and against his will US had insisted on publishing notes. He said he had actually never consented to their publication and was astonished receive letter from Embassy expressing appreciation his willingness that exchange be published. When he saw US Government was determined to publish, he had finally insisted previous messages exchanged last January between him and Presidentelect be also published. I told him it had been my understanding leak had occurred in his office and in view distorted public version of President’s letter unfavorable to US, US Government had thereupon insisted exchange be published. He denied heatedly Iranians had been guilty of leaks. No Iranian except himself and Saleh, US Embassy Iranian assistant and interpretor, had been aware
of existence these letters. He had kept them among his own private papers, not in office files. I intimated I not sure his private papers were kept in manner which would prevent clever agents having access to them. I also pointed out there were certain modern hearing devices which might result in knowledge this kind falling into possession of agents parties hostile both to Iran and US. He continued insist certain Americans had deliberately leaked in order that public knowledge of contents of President’s letter might weaken his government. I told him that I knew that exchange had been handled in US and Tehran in most discreet manner by trusted officials and I sure no US leak.

6. Mosadeq then outlined events which led to dissolution Majlis. His narrative in general in line with information already furnished Department by Embassy. He maintained however that 30 members Majlis had been bought outright by British. Only 40 votes had not been bought. Ten of these 40 votes could easily have been purchased for 100,000 tomans and when he learned that negotiations were in progress to complete such purchasing operation he decided that British purchased Majlis was unworthy of Iranian people and should be eliminated. He asked me if I had any comments to make regarding his dissolution Majlis.

7. I reminded him he inviting me comment on Iran internal affairs. I realized it not usual for comments of this kind to be offered by foreign diplomat. Nevertheless he would recall that during some of our past conversations I had overcome my scruples in this respect. I said only comment which I wished to offer at this point was that it seemed to me unfortunate for Iran and no compliment Iranian people that government of Iran apparently could not be based on a Parliament. Iran was in most dangerous international position and I thought it would be more secure if all organs provided for in Iranian constitution could be functioning with at least certain degree of harmony.

8. I told him I particularly interested in events recent days. I would like to know more about effort replace him by General Zahedi. He said on evening of 15th Col. Nasiri had approached his house apparently to arrest him. Col. Nasiri himself, however, had been arrested and number other arrests followed. He had taken oath not try to oust Shah and would have lived up this oath if Shah had not engaged in venture this kind. Clear Nasiri had been sent by Shah arrest him and Shah had been prompted by British.

9. I asked Mosadeq if he had reason believe it true Shah had issued firman (decrees) removing him as Prime Minister and appointing Zahedi in his place. Mosadeq said he had never seen such decree and if he had it would have made no (repeat no) difference. His position for some time had been that Shah’s powers
were only of ceremonial character; that Shah had no (repeat no) right on his personal responsibility issue firman calling for change in government. I said I particularly interested in this point, and I would like to report it carefully to United States Government. Was I to understand (a) he had no (repeat no) official knowledge that Shah had issued firman removing him as Prime Minister, and (b) even if he should find that Shah had issued such firman in present circumstances he would consider it to be invalid? He replied “precisely”.

10. Before departing I told Mosadeq that during 24 hours since my return Tehran, members American official family here had received intimations from various Iranian authorities which caused me believe some Iranian officials suspected Embassy harboring Iranian political refugees. I would like tell him point blank this untrue. My present policy in this respect was as follows: (a) if political refugees should endeavor to enter Embassy, efforts would be made to stop them; (b) if they should succeed in entering compound, efforts would be made to persuade them to leave voluntarily; (c) if they should refuse to leave voluntarily, it my intention to notify Iranian authorities that persons had taken refuge in Embassy and that I was telegraphing my government for instructions.

11. Mosadeq thanked me for my statement and said he would like add statement of his own. In case any Iranian political fugitives would take refuge in Embassy, he would like Embassy keep them there. I asked if in such event Iranian Government prepared defray expenses for lodging and food or whether he would expect this to come out of Point IV funds. He said Iranian Government would be glad, despite limited budget, pay expenses those refugees.

Henderson
282. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)  
Washington, August 19, 1953.  
SUBJECT: Conversation with Governor Stassen August 19, 1953, concerning FOA support for Zahedi regime

"1. Colonel White and the undersigned called upon Governor Stassen at his office this afternoon in order to follow up on earlier conversations between Governor Stassen and the Director in which Governor Stassen had indicated that his agency would be in a position to move promptly to the support of the new regime with new or steppedup programs of economic assistance. (I had learned from General Smith just prior to the meeting with Governor Stassen that the two of them had discussed this matter at some length and were in agreement that FOA should move in with substantial economic assistance at the right moment.)"

286. Telegram From the Station in Iran to the Central Intelligence Agency  
Tehran, August 19, 1953

"TEHE 742. 1. Overthrow of Mossadeq appears on verge of success. Zahedi now at radio station.  
2. Ambassador Henderson and I request urgently that five million dollars be held immediately available to support new govt and enable it meet govt payroll. Will advise later how money should be deposited but see no need ship money out here."

خوشحالی آمریکایی‌ها از پیروزی کودتا و تبریک به خودشان
292. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Iran
Washington, August 20, 1953

"DIR 16474. 1. CIA officials are joined by the appropriate divisional and branch
officers in extending commendation and congratulations to all Tehran Station
personnel. Kermit Roosevelt both in HQS and on scene of action has distinguished
himself and served US Govt and CIA well. We respect the Tehran group for their
great stauchness in the face of difficulties and temporary discouragement. We are
proud of the Tehran Station personnel who have all to varying degrees
conducted greatly to the success of overthrow. Commendation is also extended
to CIA official who has done an excellent job backstopping the operation [less
than 1 line not declassified] and has handled with credit the sensitive task of
conducting liaison [less than 1 line not declassified].
2. The DCI wished to extend his warmest personal congratulations to Kermit
Roosevelt for a superbly and successfully executed mission. Roosevelt’s
persistence, extreme competence and courage should be commended most
highly.
3. Commendation also being prepared for CIA official upon latter’s return."

301. Letter From Iranian Prime Minister Zahedi to President Eisenhower
Tehran, August 26, 1953.

Dear Mr. President:
I wish to express to you and through you to the American people the appreciation
of the Iranian Government and people for the aid which the United States has
extended to Iran during recent years. This aid has contributed much to the
security of the country and to the raising of its technical efficiency. The assistance
which the United States is already rendering Iran, helpful as it is, is unfortunately
not sufficient in amount and character to tide Iran over the financial and
economic crisis which I find it to be facing. The treasury is empty; foreign
exchange resources are exhausted; the national economy is deteriorated. Iran
needs immediate financial aid to enable it to emerge from a state of economic
and financial chaos. Iran also requires aid of an economic character to enable it to
carry out programs which the government is preparing for developing its agriculture and industry, for exploiting its rich mineral resources, for improving its transport and communications, for strengthening its internal and foreign trade, and for raising the health, education and technical levels of the Iranian people. The people of Iran are anxious to have a prosperous, orderly country in which they can enjoy higher standards of living and make greater use of their talents and resources. They are willing, if given an opportunity, to work hard in order to obtain these objectives, but the realization of their aspirations may be delayed for sometime unless they receive technical, financial, and economic aid from abroad. I hope that the United States will find it possible at this critical moment in Iranian history to come to my country’s assistance as it has done on occasions in the past. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that it is the intention of the new Government of Iran not only to strengthen the country internally but also to improve its international position. The government desires to maintain friendly relations with the other members of the family of nations on a basis of mutual respect. It will pursue a policy of eliminating such differences as may exist or which may develop between other countries and itself in a spirit of friendliness and in accordance with accepted principles of international intercourse. I am sure that I voice the feelings of the great majority of the people of Iran when I state that Iran desires to contribute its share to the maintenance of peace and to the promotion of international goodwill. Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

General F. Zahedi

302. Letter From President Eisenhower to Iranian Prime Minister Zahedi
Washington, August 26, 1953.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have received your letter of August 26 regarding the problems which you face in Iran. The American people continue to be deeply interested in the independence of Iran and the well-being of the Iranian people. We have followed policies in Iran, as in other countries of the free world, designed to assist peoples of those countries to bring about economic development which will lead to higher standards of living and wider horizons in knowledge and opportunity. I am gratified that the aid which we have extended has contributed to the security of Iran and to the raising of the technical efficiency of the Iranian people. I am also
pleased to have your assurance that your Government desires to maintain friendly relations with other members of the family of nations and that it will pursue a policy of eliminating such differences as may exist or which may develop with other countries in a spirit of friendliness and in accordance with accepted principles of international intercourse. In an effort to assist you in dealing with your immediate problems, I have authorized my Ambassador to Iran to consult with you regarding the development of our aid programs there. I recognize that your needs are pressing. Your request will receive our sympathetic consideration and I can assure you that we stand ready to assist you in achieving the aspirations for your country which you have outlined. Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dwight D. Eisenhower
136/1; NSC Actions Nos. 875–b and 766–a) General Cabell briefed the Council on the most recent developments in Iran. He said that General Zahedi appeared to be establishing a moderate nationalist government. There was real hope for its stability and for improvement in Iran’s economic and financial situation. Members of the new government were as experienced and capable as one could anticipate in Iran, although the Shah had expressed disappointment at the small number of new faces in the Cabinet. Indications are that General Zahedi will oppose the indiscriminate imposition of martial law, and when his control is firmly established he is expected to recall the Majlis. Elections for a new Majlis are to be anticipated thereafter. The army will doubtless manipulate these elections to ensure a conservative majority in the new Parliament. General Cabell predicted that the Tudeh Party would be ruthlessly curbed, with the result that it would probably go underground. Its leadership is still intact, and it may be expected to work with the pro-Mossadegh factions to discredit the Shah and the new regime. The allegiance of the tribes, said General Cabell, is not yet completely clear, but the fact that they have never been able to work in concert with one another minimizes the dangers which Zahedi must anticipate from the tribes. General Cabell stated that the most urgent problems confronting the new government of Iran are economic and financial. It is unlikely that an agreement with Britain, to settle the oil controversy, can be readily and quickly achieved, if for no other reason than that General Zahedi cannot afford to seem a British stooge. However, concluded General Cabell, if United States financial aid can be promptly extended, Iran will again assume its place in the pro-Western grouping of nations and American relations with Iran will improve. Relations between Iran and Great Britain are not likely to undergo any sudden change, and a settlement of the outstanding issues between the Soviet Union and Iran is unlikely at present. Secretary Dulles commented that while what happened in Iran was spontaneous, he did feel obliged to say that a number of people in Iran had kept their heads and maintained their courage when the situation looked very tough. He felt that CIA in particular was entitled to great praise. He also expressed himself as pleased with the cooperation between CIA, State and FOA. As a result of what had happened, Secretary Dulles informed the Council, the United States now had a “second chance” in Iran when all hope of avoiding a Communist Iran appeared to have vanished. Secretary Dulles said that there had been an exchange of letters between the President and General Zahedi. Secretary Dulles summarized General Zahedi’s letter, pointing out the latter’s statement that he desired to reconsider the problem of the oil settlement and that he needed assistance. The President
had replied that General Zahedi’s request would receive sympathetic consideration. Secretary Dulles went on to point out that in order to assist the new regime, the Administration would require funds beyond those programmed in the Mutual Security Act. The additional funds would probably be in the neighborhood of $35 million.

The most difficult problem confronting us was how to develop revenues for Iran out of her oil. We can’t very well subsidize Iranian oil when we can’t make full use of present resources available to us. Since we must not, however, miss this second chance, Secretary Dulles suggested that we ought to select quickly an individual knowledgeable in the petroleum field, and a skillful negotiator, and then turn over to him full power to negotiate a settlement. In order to pick such a man quickly and get him started, Secretary Dulles recommended that the choice be entrusted to a committee consisting of himself, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Stassen. Mr. Cutler inquired whether such an individual would be a special representative of the President. Secretary Dulles replied that he could represent the President or the Secretary of State. In any case, he would head up a task force. The main thing is to assure that all the manifold ideas for achieving a settlement should channel through this individual.

Secretary Dulles’ proposal was well received by the Council, and CIA asked to be included in the committee if its representation thereon appeared useful.

Mr. Cutler then reminded the members of the Council of the task which it had asked the Attorney General to perform, noted that Judge Barnes had been appointed by the Attorney General to carry out this task, and that Judge Barnes was planning a committee of three individuals to perform the task. Mr. Cutler stated that Judge Barnes had already produced a tentative statement of the problem to which his committee should address itself. Mr. Cutler further pointed out the relationship between Judge Barnes’ assignment and the committee which had been contemplated in NSC 138/1, which, of course, had never materialized. Mr. Cutler assured the members of the Council that Judge Barnes would consult with the heads of appropriate departments and agencies before completing his report, which he hoped to have ready by December. Secretary Dulles inquired whether any new consideration was now being given to postponing the civil suit against the so-called oil cartel. As he understood it, open hearings on the case were scheduled to begin in September, and while he sympathized with the problem confronting the Attorney General, to whom was entrusted the task of carrying out the law of the land, he was still very worried over the implications of this suit for the national security and for our foreign relations. It would be highly
advantageous, said Secretary Dulles, if the case could possibly be settled out of court.

Secretary Humphrey expressed emphatic agreement with Secretary Dulles, and inquired whether his assignment should be added to that contemplated by the special representative. Secretary Dulles expressed doubts as to the feasibility of Secretary Humphrey’s proposal, but again insisted that the civil proceedings should be postponed if it was humanly possible.

Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council invite the Attorney General to come to the next meeting of the Council to hear the arguments and to discuss possible postponement of the suit. It developed that the Attorney General would be out of town except for one day this week, and Mr. Cutler therefore suggested that the Secretary of State get in touch with the Attorney General and explain to him the Council’s unanimous feeling that, for reasons of national security, it favored postponement of the civil suit.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the situation in Iran in the light of an oral briefing by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence on developments, and in the light of an oral report by the Secretary of State on actions taken or contemplated with respect to the situation.

b. Agreed that the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Director of Central Intelligence, should nominate, for the President’s consideration, an individual to act as a special representative of the United States to deal with problems related to an Anglo-Iranian oil settlement.

c. Noted an oral report by Mr. Cutler regarding the status of the Attorney General’s study of the Near East oil situation pursuant to NSC Action No. 875–b.

d. Agreed, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, to recommend to the President that in the interests of national security, in view of the Iranian situation, the Attorney General be requested to conduct proceedings in the so-called oil cartel civil suit, now being carried on as indicated in NSC Action No. 766–a, with due regard for their effect upon United States foreign relations.

Note: The action in b above subsequently referred to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Director of Central Intelligence, for implementation. The recommendation in d above subsequently approved by the President and
transmitted to the Attorney General for appropriate action. [Omitted here is discussion of items 4–8.]
S. Everett Gleason

The Aftermath of Operation TPAJAX, September 1953–December 1954
309. Memorandum From the Acting Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans ([name not declassified]) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles
Washington, September 2, 1953.
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between Mr. Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for NEA, and John Waller, CNEA–4, Concerning Allayar Saleh, Iranian Ambassador to the United States

"The conversation reported herein took place at the request of the Deputy Director, Plans:
1. Mr. Waller called Mr. Byroade’s attention to the fact that Ambassador Saleh had tendered his resignation and presumably planned to return to Iran in the near future. Information had reached us to the effect that the Iranian government had urged Saleh to remain at his post and withdraw his resignation. However, it appeared that Ambassador Saleh definitely intended to relinquish his post. Mr. Waller stated that CIA was concerned by the prospect of Saleh’s return to Iran at this time in view of his Iran Party ties and his very considerable personal prestige which might be exploited by pro-Mossadeq or even pro-Tudeh political factions which are in current opposition to the Shah and the Zahedi government. In this connection Mr. Waller recalled the recent role of the Iran Party in support of Premier Mossadeq and in violent opposition to the return of the Shah, which role had brought the Iran Party dangerously close to outright alliance with the Tudeh Party.
2. Mr. Waller observed that this was essentially a Department of State problem but that CIA felt that it was appropriate for its views to be brought to the attention of the Department of State. Furthermore, it would be perhaps possible
for CIA to take covert action designed to neutralize any adverse effect which Mr. Saleh’s return might occasion.

3. Mr. Byroade acknowledged the fact that the possible problems presented by Ambassador Saleh’s return to Iran were of concern to the Department of State. He stated that he also had received information to the effect that the Zahedi government had urged Saleh to remain at his post in Washington and that Ambassador Saleh had refused to do so. Mr. Byroade added that in his opinion Saleh now regretted having announced in such strong terms his allegiance to Mossadeq and opposition to General Zahedi. In Mr. Byroade’s opinion, Ambassador Saleh’s press release on the subject was hastily made and made on the basis of inadequate information from Iran which had caused Mr. Saleh to under-estimate the degree of popular support for the Shah. Mr. Byroade stated that the Department probably should have gotten to Ambassador Saleh before he made his unfortunate remarks to the press, but that since these remarks were made it would appear that Ambassador Saleh had burned his bridges behind him. Mr. Byroade believed that there was absolutely no chance that Saleh would at this point consider remaining as Ambassador to the U.S.

4. With regard to possible black campaigns intended to discredit Saleh or otherwise neutralize him in Iran, Mr. Byroade felt that we should proceed with caution since Saleh, given favorable circumstances, might later prove helpful to the U.S. Mr. Byroade stated that the Department had an informal channel of contact with Saleh through Mr. Engert, former Ambassador to Iran and Ambassador to Afghanistan. Through this contact it might be possible to encourage Saleh to delay his return to Iran. However, Engert had reported recently that Saleh intended to return straightway to Iran despite real fear and apprehension as to his reception there.

5. Mr. Byroade stated that he was not sure we need worry about future opposition activities by Saleh in Iran. Nevertheless, he shared to some extent CIA’s concern in this regard. Mr. Byroade said he would like to think about the problem further and he would let CIA know of any action which the Department felt it should or could take either to delay Saleh’s return to Iran, or to neutralize him once in Iran."

"نکته اصلی در این گزارش، نگرانی آمریکایی‌ها از بازگشت اللهیار صالح، سفیر ایران در آمریکا به ایران پس از کودتا است. آنها نگران بودند میادا با بازگشت صالح، طرفداران مصدق با رهبری او مشکلاتی برای دولت کودتا ایجاد کنند."
339. Memorandum From the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, October 29, 1953

SUBJECT: Certain Aspects of the Present Situation in Iran Which Appear to Require Further Attention by the United States Government; the Significance and Value of an Appropriate Program of Military Assistance

"1. While the coup of 16/19 August which restored the Shah to effective power may now definitely be considered as a success, there are indications nevertheless that the position of the Shah and of his government is by no means secure. The Zahedi cabinet which was riding high at the time of the announcement of American economic aid is currently hitting a squall of opposition engendered by disgruntled power seekers (such as Mullah Kashani), Mossadeq supporters including the Tudeh (who are making a desperate and possibly successful effort to maintain their organization in being), and an increasingly larger segment of Bazaar merchants (whose business prospects seem to be threatened by Zahedi’s “reforms”)."