داود غلامآزاد
دربارهٔ ضرورتِ برپاییِ حسِّ مشترک
دربارهٔ واقعیتهای اجتماعیِ ناهمگونِ اردوگاهها و پیوستارِ بهیادسپردهٔ دگرگونی
۱.
در جستاری پیشین — «دربارهٔ ضرورتِ کارِ رابطهایِ گروههای اپوزیسیون برای گذارِ دموکراتیک از جمهوری اسلامی» — نشان دادم که بخشی از ناتوانیِ اپوزیسیون خودساخته است. استدلال چنین بود: همکاری بی تفاهم ممکن نیست، و تفاهم از آن رو درمیماند که جنبهای از هر پیام نادیده گرفته میشود که همهچیز به آن بسته است. هر پیام دو چیز را با هم میگوید: چیزی دربارهٔ یک موضوع، و چیزی دربارهٔ نسبتی که گوینده و شنونده با هم دارند. همین جنبهٔ دوم، جنبهٔ رابطهای، تعیین میکند که آیا جنبهٔ نخست اصلاً شنیده میشود یا نه. هر که دیگری را دشمن یا نابالغ خطاب کند، سنجیدهترین سخنش هم دیگر همچون سخنِ یک برابر شنیده نمیشود. از این رو چاره این بود که پیامِ رابطهای دگرگون شود: از بالاوپایینِ قیمومت و از دوستودشمنِ اردوگاهها بهسوی دیدارِ دیگری همچون شهروندی همارز. جستارِ کنونی از همینجا آغاز میکند و یک گام ژرفتر میرود.
زیرا زیرِ این لایه، لایهای دیگر خوابیده است — لایهای که آنجا لمس شد، اما تا ته گشوده نشد: همانجا که سخن از چیزی بود که ساختهایم و آن را دادهشده میپنداریم. اردوگاهها فقط در نسبتی مسموم با هم نیستند؛ آنها در واقعیتهایی متفاوت زندگی میکنند. هر اردوگاه انبانی از واقعیتها را با خود دارد که آنها را بیچونوچرا دادهشده میگیرد و هویتش بر همانها استوار است — و واقعیتهای یکی با واقعیتهای دیگری میستیزد. تا اینگونه است، حتی پیامِ رابطهایِ دگرگونشده هم به دیوار میخورد. نزاع بهشیوهٔ موضوعی حل نمیشود، نهفقط چون بر سرِ کرامت ستیز است، بلکه چون هیچ زمینِ مشترکی از واقعیتها در کار نیست تا بر آن بتوان چیزی را حل کرد. جستارِ پیشِ رو همین زمینِ ژرفتر را دنبال میکند و میپرسد: چگونه میتوان زمینی مشترک — یک حسِّ مشترک — برپا کرد؟
۲.
نخست باید دید «واقعیتِ اجتماعی» چیست. اصولِ موضوعهٔ ایمانی و ارزشداشتهایی هستند که فرد آنها را نه نظرِ خود، بلکه چیزی میداند که جهان پیشِ پایش گذاشته است: چیزی که پیش از او بوده، او را دربرگرفته، به او بند زده، و مانندِ یک واقعیتِ شیءشده در برابرش میایستد. زبانی که او نساخته است؛ مرزِ سرزمینش؛ نظمِ آنچه آبرومند شمرده میشود. چنین واقعیتی را آدمیان با هم ساختهاند، و با این حال در برابرِ فرد همچون امری عینی میایستد که نمیتواند با آرزو از میانش بردارد. در کنشِ مشترک پدید میآید، از سازندگانش جدا میشود و به چیزی مستقل بدل میگردد؛ آنگاه در برابرِ نسلهای بعد همچون نظمی آماده میایستد. آنان آن را ازپیشموجود مییابند، درونیاش میکنند و به دیگران میسپارند — تا سرانجام دیگر کسی نمیبیند که ساختهٔ دستِ آدمی است. همین دولبگی — ساختهشده، و با این حال دادهشده تجربهشده — ریشهٔ جستارِ نخست بود: اشتباهگرفتنِ ساخته با داده، از یاد بردنِ اینکه چنین نهادههایی «انگاشت»اند. اینجا همان ریشه در لایهای ژرفتر بازمیگردد. زیرا پیامدبارترین واقعیتهای اجتماعی همانهاییاند که میگویند آدمی که هست و از کجا آمده است — واقعیتهای هویتبخش.
۳.
آدمیان، چه همچون فرد و چه همچون گروه، چنین واقعیتهایی را از کجا میگیرند؟ نه از فهرستی سرد از گذشته. و اینجا نخست باید جلوِ یک سوءتفاهم را گرفت که بهآسانی راه مییابد: نه فردِ آدمی واحدی مستقل است و نه گروه. هر دو لحظههایی از یک پیکربندی و درهمتنیدگیِ فراگیرترند. همانگونه که هیچ انسانی جدا از نسبتهایش با دیگران نیست، هیچ گروهی هم نیست که جدا از گروههای دیگر یا جدا از آدمیانی که آن را میسازند وجود داشته باشد. فرد تنها در میانِ دیگران فرد میشود، و گروه تنها در افرادی هست که خود را از آنِ آن میدانند — و تنها در نسبت با گروههایی که خود را از آنها جدا میکند. هیچکس خودی ندارد که در دادوستد با دیگران ساخته نشده باشد، و هیچ گروهی انبانی ندارد که افرادش آن را نکشند و در برابرِ گروههای دیگر شکل نگیرد. حتی آنچه کسی برای خود حق و یقین میداند، تنها در گفتوگو با دیگران بر او روشن میشود. تصویرِ آدمی از خودش نه از یک تن، بلکه از دو تن آغاز میشود.
بر هر دو سوی این ماجرا یک پیوستارِ بهیادسپردهٔ دگرگونی هست، و این دو در هم تنیدهاند. بر سوی فرد، این همان جریانِ آگاهیِ اوست: آن روانیِ پیوسته و هیچگاهنیاسودهٔ ادراکها و احساسها و خاطرهها، که فرد از راهِ آن خود را در گذرِ زمان یک «من»ِ واحد مییابد — پیوستاری زندگینامهای که به او میگوید همان است که دیروز بود. بر سوی گروه، این همان تاریخِ اجتماعاًساختهشده است: دگرگونیِ «ما» که با هم به یاد سپرده و مرتب و تفسیر شده، و آدمیان همچون گروه از راهِ آن میدانند از کجا آمدهاند. و یکی بی دیگری بهدست نمیآید. جریانِ آگاهیِ فرد از همان آغاز به تفسیرهای کسانِ خودش آغشته است، و تاریخِ گروه تنها زمانی زنده میماند که تکتکِ افراد آن را در جریانِ خود بگیرند و پیش ببرند. وانگهی هیچیک از این دو پیوستار بیواسطه نگهداشته نمیشود، بلکه از راهِ نمادها — از راهِ زبان و تصویر و روایت — که تنها در آنهاست که دانش و خاطره و خودتفسیری میتوانند بمانند و به دیگری برسند.
میتوان این را در نظمی بزرگتر نشاند. هر تجربهای بسته است به صورتهای مکان و زمان — به سه بُعدِ مکان و یک بُعدِ زمان —، که بی آنها اصلاً چیزی به ما داده نمیشود؛ همینها شرطیاند که زیرِ آن جهانی برای ما پدید میآید. اما آدمی، فراتر از این چهار بُعد، بُعدِ پنجمی هم دارد که هیچ موجودِ دیگری آن را به اینسان ندارد: بُعدِ نمادین. او جهان را نه بیواسطه، بلکه از راهِ نمادها درمییابد — بهویژه از راهِ زبان — و دانش و خاطره و خودتفسیری تنها در همین بُعدِ نمادین پابرجا میمانند. و نمادها پردهای نیستند که میانِ آدمی و جهانی ازپیشآماده کشیده شده باشد؛ آنها خودِ جهاناند، آنگونه که تجربه میشود. آنچه جماعتی آن را واقعیت میداند، از راهِ نمادهایش به او رسیده است، و انبانِ دیگری از نمادها یعنی جهانی دیگر از تجربه. درست همینجا، در بُعدِ پنجم، است که واقعیتهای اجتماعی و پیوستارِ بهیادسپردهٔ دگرگونی جای دارند. آنها چیزهای مکان نیستند، بلکه ساختههای نمادند — و با این حال به همان سختیِ هر دیوار بند میزنند. و از آنجا که آدمی نماد در اختیار دارد، میتواند به گذشتهٔ خود نسبتی بگیرد، بهجای آنکه صرفاً اسیرِ آن باشد.
اما چگونه از افرادِ بسیار یک گروه پدید میآید؟ از راهِ اینکه افراد با یکدیگر همذاتپنداری میکنند — و آن هم از راهِ اصولِ موضوعهٔ ایمانی و ارزشداشتهای مشترک که عاطفیباراند. اصلِ موضوعهٔ ایمانی جملهای است دربارهٔ جهان که آدمی دیگر آن را نمیسنجد، چون بر آن ایستاده است: بنیانفرضی که آن را نه فرض، بلکه حقیقتی بدیهی میگیرد. ارزشداشت هم بندِ عاطفی است به آنچه باید نیک و آبرومند شمرده شود. هیچکدام صرفاً دانسته نمیشوند؛ هر دو با احساس بار میشوند، و همین بارِ عاطفی است که آنها را به بندی بدل میکند که افراد را به یک «ما» گره میزند. بدینسان اصولِ موضوعه و ارزشداشتهای مشترک خود واقعیتِ اجتماعی میشوند — چیزی که در برابرِ فرد همچون امری دادهشده و الزامآور میایستد، هرچند تنها در تصدیقِ مشترکِ همان بسیاران هستی دارد. و اینکه این بند صرفاً یک «باور» نیست، ریشهای تنانه دارد: تصویرهای درونیای که آدمی خود را با آنها راه میبرد، به کانونهای برانگیختگیِ مغز گره خوردهاند، همانها که معنا و احساس میسازند. از این رو اصلِ موضوعهٔ ایمانی اندیشهای صرف نیست، بلکه جهتگیریای است که در تن لنگر انداخته — و برای همین است که دستزدن به آن، نه همچون یک مخالفت، بلکه همچون یک تهدید حس میشود.
پس جماعت از خود نمیداند که کیست؛ آن را از راهِ پیوستگیِ بهیادسپردهٔ دگرگونیهای خویش میداند — از راهِ تاریخی از شدنِ خود، که بعداً مرتب و گزیده و به یک روندِ بههمپیوسته فشرده شده و از آغازی تا خودِ کنونی میرسد. همین پیوستارِ بهیادسپردهٔ دگرگونی است که بنیادِ خودانگارهٔ جمعی است: میگوید گروه از کجا آمده، چه کشیده و چه کرده، خود را مدیونِ کیست و از که باید بپرهیزد. انباری از واقعیتهای گذشته نیست، بلکه پیکرهای تفسیری است که پیوسته ازنو ساخته میشود — و درست چون آدمی آن را تاریخِ خودش حس میکند، نه همچون تفسیر، بلکه همچون واقعیت، همچون خودِ گذشتهٔ عینی به چشمش میآید. پس واقعیتهای هویتبخشِ یک اردوگاه همان تهنشستهای سفتشدهٔ پیوستارِ بهیادسپردهٔ دگرگونیِ آناند، که اصولِ موضوعهٔ ایمانی و ارزشداشتهای عاطفیبار آنها را میکشند و دادهشده گرفته میشوند. و چون این واقعیتها به ارزشِ خود میرسند — همان ارزشی که وابستگانِ گروه امنیت و غرورشان را از آن میگیرند — از هر نظرِ ساده ژرفتر مینشینند: هر که به آنها دست بزند، به یک نظر دست نزده، بلکه به همان زمینی دست زده که فرد بر آن ایستاده است، هم همچون فرد و هم همچون عضوِ «ما»یِ خویش. و چون هیچ گروهی جدا از گروههایی نیست که خود را از آنها جدا میکند، این واقعیتهای بنیادین هم هرگز ناب از دلِ خودِ اردوگاه بیرون نمیآیند: از همان آغاز در برابرِ دیگران شکل گرفتهاند و نفیِ آنان را همینحالا در خود دارند.
۴.
اکنون گامِ سرنوشتساز. حالا میتوان دید که واقعیتهای ناسازگارِ اردوگاهها اینطور پدید نمیآیند که هر اردوگاه تاریخِ خود را جدا و مستقل از دیگری بسازد و بعد این تاریخهای آماده بهتصادف به هم بخورند. آن ناسازگاری یک برخوردِ بعدی نیست، بلکه خودِ قاعدهای است که این واقعیتها بر پایهٔ آن ساخته میشوند. چون هر اردوگاه تنها در برابرِ دیگری اردوگاه میشود، واقعیتِ بنیادینش از همان آغاز در برابرِ آن دیگری شکل میگیرد: یکی خود را برحق میکند از راهِ اینکه دیگری را خیانتکار مینهد؛ عملِ بنیانگذارش را تنها زمانی دارد که همان عمل، همزمان، سرنگونی یا استبدادِ دیگری باشد. بدینسان یک رخدادِ واحد به دو پیوستار وارد میشود، اما نه با نشانهای صرفاً متفاوت، بلکه با نشانهٔ وارونه — و ناگزیر چنین است، چون هر نشانه دیگری را میطلبد. آنچه برای یکی عملِ بنیانگذار است، برای دیگری خیانت است؛ آنچه برای یکی نظمِ زرّین است، برای دیگری استبداد؛ آنچه برای یکی رهایی است، برای دیگری سقوط. هر اردوگاه غرورِ گروهیِ خود را از همان واقعیتی میگیرد که مایهٔ ننگِ دیگری است، و برای همین خوارکردنِ دیگری را نه همچون چیزی افزوده، بلکه همچون روی دیگرِ خودپاییِ خویش در خود دارد.
اینجا باید تمایزی گذاشت که بی آن، هر آنچه در پی میآید به بیراهه میرود. اینکه آدمی در جماعتی بزرگ میشود و میآموزد با چشمِ آن ببیند، به این معنا نیست که دیگر با چشمِ خود نمیبیند. فرد با نگاهِ کسانِ خودش مینگرد — جهان را در همان قالبهایی میبیند که جماعتش در او نشانده است — و با این حال این چشمِ خودِ اوست که میبیند. در همین شکاف، میانِ نگاهی که جماعت شکل داده و دیدنی که از آنِ خودِ اوست، همهٔ فضای آزادی نهفته است. همین توضیح میدهد که چرا هیچ اردوگاهی هرگز بهکلی بسته نیست: همیشه کسانی هستند که دیدنِ خودشان با آن نگاهِ نشانده جور درنمیآید، کسانی که یک واقعیت را جز آنطور میبینند که گروه دیدنش را تجویز کرده است. هر که این را نادیده بگیرد، بهآسانی در خطرناکترین سوءتفاهمها میافتد: این خیال که زمینِ مشترک را میتوان از راهِ اینکه همه با یک چشم ببینند بهدست آورد. این حسِّ مشترک نیست، بلکه همسانسازی است. زمینِ مشترکی که سخن بر سرِ آن است، آن یک نگاه نیست که همه باید به آن تن دهند، بلکه زمینی است که بر آن، نگاههای گوناگون میتوانند کنارِ هم بایستند، بیآنکه ناچار باشند یکدیگر را محو کنند.
و چون هر پیوستار نه یک تفسیر از میانِ تفسیرهای ممکن، بلکه خودِ تاریخِ عینی گرفته میشود، اردوگاهها نهتنها یک واقعیت را جور دیگری ارزیابی میکنند — بلکه در انبانهایی ناسازگار از واقعیتها زندگی میکنند. هر یک جهان را با همان چشمِ نشاندهٔ کسانِ خودش میبیند، و آنچه یکی واقعیت میبیند، دیگری یا اصلاً نمیبیند یا وارونهاش را میبیند. هر یک واقعیتهای بنیادینِ خود را در برابرِ دیگری به میدان میآورد و بدینسان واقعیتهای بنیادینِ دیگری را از ریشه به تردید میکشد. برای همین است که نزاع، سرسختانهتر از آنچه جستارِ نخست مینمود، تن به حلِ موضوعی نمیدهد: زیرِ ستیز بر سرِ کرامت، ستیزی بر سرِ خودِ واقعیت خوابیده است. دو تن که یکدیگر را جور دیگری ارج مینهند، باز میتوانند بر زمینی مشترک به هم برسند؛ اما دو تن که در واقعیتهای جداگانه ایستادهاند، هیچ زمینِ مشترکی ندارند که بر آن به هم برسند. واقعیتِ یکی دروغِ دیگری است.
۵.
اینجا روشن میشود که بهراستی چه کم است. حسِّ مشترک کم است — و این واژه را باید در هر دو معنایش گرفت. حسِّ مشترک از یک سو همان حسِ مشترکی است که با آن، آدمهای گوناگون همان جهان را جهانی مشترک میشناسند: توانِ اینکه یک واقعیت را واقعیتی ببینی که دیگری هم میتواند آن را واقعیت ببیند. و از سوی دیگر، حس نسبت به خودِ امرِ مشترک است — روآوردن به خیری که فقط خیرِ گروهِ خودی نیست، بلکه خیرِ آن جامعهٔ سیاسیِ مشترک است که همه با هم در آن ایستادهاند. این دو معنا یکیاند: تنها آنجا که جهانی مشترک بهرسمیت شناخته شود، میتوان خیری مشترک را خواست. اما آنجا که هر اردوگاه واقعیتِ ساختهٔ خود را میزید، هر دو کماند. جهانِ مشترکی نیست، چون هر کس واقعیتهای خودش را دارد؛ و خیرِ مشترکی نیست، چون هیچ امرِ مشترکی نیست که خیری در آن قسمت شود. پس حسِّ مشترک هیچ ارثِ آمادهای نیست که اپوزیسیون فقط لازم باشد آن را به یاد بیاورد. درست همان چیزی است که اپوزیسیون ندارد — و نخست باید ساخته شود.
با این حال حسِّ مشترک، اگر درست فهمیده شود، درست بهمعنای یکدستکردنِ تفاوتها نیست. نمیخواهد که همه یک تاریخ را حق بدانند و با یک چشم ببینند؛ فقط میخواهد که نگاههای گوناگون، خود را نگاههایی به یک جهانِ مشترک بدانند. و درست برای همین، حسِّ مشترک بر شرطی استوار است که بی آن بهدست نمیآید: بر رواداری. رواداری نه بیاعتنایی به حقیقت است و نه سهلانگاریِ اینکه هرچه شد شد؛ توانی است بهدشواریبهدستآمده که تفسیرِ دیگری را تفسیری ممکن بداند، حتی آنجا که خودش آن را نمیپذیرد — و تفسیرِ خود را تفسیر بداند، نه خودِ واقعیت. رواداری شرطِ امکانِ یک جامعهٔ سیاسیِ دموکراتیک است، چون چنین جامعهای درست همین است: که آدمهایی با حقیقتهای گوناگون، باز بتوانند در یک جهانِ مشترک زندگی کنند و یک خیرِ مشترک بخواهند. حسِّ مشترکِ بی رواداری اصلاً حسِّ مشترک نیست؛ آن، چیرگیِ یک اردوگاه است که خود را جای امرِ مشترک جا میزند — همان همسانسازیای که درست همان چیزی را نابود میکند که ادعای ساختنش را دارد.
۶.
اکنون میتوان مثبت گفت که حسِّ مشترک، وقتی نمیتواند آن یک جهانِ تجربهٔ مشترک باشد، در چیست. در این نیست که اردوگاهها همان جهان را تجربه کنند، بلکه در این است که هر یک در دیگری یک بینندهٔ ممکنِ همان جهان را بشناسد. جهانهای تجربه گوناگون میمانند؛ آنچه عوض میشود، نسبتِ آنها با یکدیگر است. تا اردوگاهی نگاهِ خود را خودِ واقعیت بگیرد، نگاهِ دیگری ناچار دروغ است. اما همینکه نگاهِ خود را نگاه بداند — یکی از راههای ممکنِ دیدنِ همان جهان —، آنگاه نگاهِ دیگری میتواند همچون راهِ ممکنِ دوم کنارِ آن بایستد، بیآنکه نگاهِ نخست خود را وانهد. حسِّ مشترک درست همین چیزِ دوم است: نه آن یک جهان که همه یکسان تجربهاش کنند، بلکه این شناخت که تجربههای گوناگون، تجربههای یک جهانِ مشترکاند.
اما این حسِّ مشترک از صرفِ تحملِ دیگری برنمیخیزد. از یک بصیرتِ همدلانه برمیخیزد: از این درک که ادراکِ متفاوتِ یک رخدادِ واحد ضروری است — ضروری، چون آدمهایی که ادراک میکنند از تجربههای گوناگون آمدهاند. هر که فهمیده باشد چرا دیگری ناچار است همان چیز را جور دیگری ببیند، دیگر نگاهِ او را صرفاً تحمل نمیکند، بلکه آن را نگاهِ منطقیِ آدمی با تاریخی دیگر میفهمد. و این فهمیدن، همدلی میخواهد: توانِ اینکه آدمی چندان خود را جای دیگری بگذارد که ببیند نگاهِ او چگونه از تجربهاش با ضرورت بیرون میآید.
این را میتوان در فرایندِ دولتسازیِ ایران نشان داد. برای اردوگاهِ میلبهمرکز، یکپارچگیِ ملی زیرِ رضا شاه عملِ بنیانگذارِ ایرانِ نوین بود — چیرگی بر فروپاشی، زایشِ دولتِ یکپارچه. اما برای مردمانِ ناپارسیزبان همان یکپارچگی همچون خشونت تجربه شد: سرکوبِ زبانشان، خفهکردنِ ویژگیِ فرهنگیشان، و فراتر از آن، نابرابریای در توسعه که تا امروز اثرش مانده و مناطقشان را واپس گذاشت، حال آنکه مرکز پیش رفت. هیچکدام از این دو ادراک دلبخواهی نیست؛ هر یک با ضرورت از تجربهٔ صاحبش بیرون آمده است. هر که تنها ادراکِ خود را حق بداند، در دیگری دروغ میبیند. اما هر که خود را جای دیگری بگذارد — هر که سرکوبِ کشیدهشده و تجربهٔ نابرابریِ توسعه را همچون تجربهای واقعی دنبال کند — درمییابد که دیگری اصلاً نمیتواند جور دیگری ببیند، و اینکه نگاهِ او همان تاریخ را نشانه گرفته است، فقط از سوی دیگرش.
این ادراکهای وارونه تا امروز اثر میگذارند، و هر دو به یک کژدیسه سفت میشوند که جلوِ دید را میگیرد. اردوگاهِ میلبهمرکز خودپاییِ گروههای قومی را تا همین امروز تجزیهطلبی میخواند — خواستِ پارهپارهکردنِ کشور — و آنان را تجزیهطلب داغ میزند، آنجا که در واقع بر سرِ زبان و مشارکت و توسعهٔ منطقهای میکوشند. اردوگاهِ قومی هم سرکوبِ کشیدهشده را سرکوبی از سوی «فارسها» میخواند، چون فارسی تنها زبانِ رسمیِ کشور شد، حال آنکه همهٔ زبانهای دیگر سرکوب ماندند. اما هر دو خوانش همان یک واقعیت را از دست میدهند. نه یک قوم قومِ دیگر را سرکوب کرد: یک دستگاهِ دولتی بهنامِ یک زبانِ رسمیِ واحد، همهٔ زبانهای دیگر را پس زد — و به این جبرِ تکزبانی، مردمِ فارسیزبان هم همچون آدم کمتر تن نداده بودند؛ فقط زبانشان با زبانِ دولت یکی افتاد، و برای همین آن جبر را همچون جبر حس نکردند. یکیگرفتنِ دولت با یک قوم، در هر دو سو همان اشتباه است: میلبهمرکز، مقاومت در برابرِ دستگاه را تجزیهطلبی میگیرد؛ کنشگرِ قومی، دستگاه را «فارسها» میگیرد. تنها آنجا که این اشتباه درک شود، روشن میشود که این یک و آن یک، هر دو زیرِ همان یک چیرگی ایستاده بودند — و اینکه در همین، در تندادنِ مشترک به دستگاهی که گوناگونیِ زبانها را خفه کرد، همینحالا زمینی هست که بر آن، تجربههای جداافتاده میتوانند خود را تجربههای یک تاریخِ مشترک بشناسند.
اینجا، در همین بصیرتِ همدلانه، حسِّ مشترک زاده میشود — نه از راهِ اینکه یک سو نگاهِ خود را وانهد، بلکه از راهِ اینکه هر سو ضرورتِ نگاهِ دیگری را دریابد.
حالا میتوان دید که رواداریِ درستفهمیده، درست همین شناختِ همدلانه است — و نه آن گذاشتنِ بیاعتنا که رواداری بیشتر با آن اشتباه میشود. رواداریِ دروغین، دیگری را تحمل میکند از راهِ اینکه اصلاً به او کاری ندارد؛ او را در جهانِ خودش رها میکند، چون چیزی از او برایش مهم نیست. این شناخت نیست، بلکه صورتی مؤدبانه از بیاعتنایی است، و هیچ حسِّ مشترکی نمیسازد، چون جهانها را جداجدا کنارِ هم میگذارد. اما رواداریِ راستین رو به دیگری میکند: تجربهٔ او را چندان جدی میگیرد که آن را تجربهای واقعی از همان جهانی میداند که من هم در آن سهم دارم. برای همین از بیاعتنایی سختتر است، چون از آدمی میخواهد که نگاهِ خود را لحظهای معلق نگه دارد و نگاهِ دیگری را به خود راه دهد — همان جابهجاییِ توازن بهسوی فاصلهگیری که پیشتر از آن گفتیم.
درست برای همین، رواداری آن مرزی را دارد که باید برای خود بکشد. اگر رواداری یعنی شناختنِ دیگری همچون بینندهٔ ممکنِ همان جهان، پس نمیتواند آنکس را بشناسد که خودِ جهانِ مشترک را نفی میکند — آنکس که پا بر زمینِ مشترک میگذارد فقط برای اینکه دوباره ببنددش، و نگاهِ دیگری را نه ممکن، بلکه چیزی محوکردنی میداند. رواداریای که این یکی را هم بیمرز تحمل کند، خودش را برمیاندازد؛ زمینِ مشترک را دستیِ همان کسانی میسپارد که در پیِ نابودیاشاند. پس نارواداری در برابرِ نارواداری هیچ تناقضی با گشودگی نیست، بلکه شرطِ آن است. این استثنایی بر رواداری نیست، بلکه از خودِ معنای رواداری برمیآید: هر که جهانِ مشترک را نفی کند، خود را بیرونِ همان نسبتی میگذارد که رواداری را ممکن میکند.
۷.
و اینجا استدلالِ جستارِ رابطهای تیزتر و یک گام جلوتر میرود. دگرگونکردنِ پیامِ رابطهای — دیدارِ دیگری همچون برابر — لازم است، اما هنوز بس نیست؛ چون حتی برابرانی که در واقعیتهای جداگانه ایستادهاند، هیچ چیزِ مشترکی ندارند که بر سرِ آن حرف بزنند. وانگهی هر حرفی دربارهٔ واقعیتها، همزمان چیزی هم میگوید دربارهٔ اینکه گوینده خود را که میداند و در چه نسبتی با دیگری میایستد — و تا واقعیتهای اردوگاهها همدیگر را نفی میکنند، هر چنین حرفی این پیام را با خود دارد که دیگری در ناراستی میزید؛ تنها زمینِ مشترکاًساخته این پیام را بینیش میکند. پس فراتر از پیامِ رابطهای، کارِ سختتری هست: ساختنِ زمینِ مشترکِ واقعیتها، که تنها بر آن، جهانی مشترک و با آن حسِّ مشترک میتواند بایستد. این زمین را نه میتوان فرمان داد — به آدمها نمیتوان دستور داد که همان واقعیتها را باور کنند — و نه میتوان پیشفرض گرفت، آنطور که سوی میلبهمرکز ملتی را پیشفرض میگیرد که هنوز نیست. تنها میتوان آن را ساخت، و ساختنش از راهِ برپاکردنِ یک پیوستارِ بهیادسپردهٔ دگرگونیِ مشترک است: تاریخی از یک شدنِ مشترک، که با هم و در برابرِ اسطورههای هر سو نوشته میشود، و در آن رخدادها دیگر با نشانههای وارونه وارد نمیشوند، بلکه در روندی که همه میتوانند آن را از آنِ خود بدانند. این ژرفترین لایهٔ اقدامهای اعتمادساز است. آنجا که دو ملت که با هم کارهای هولناک کرده بودند — همچون آلمانیها و فرانسویها — نشستند تا تاریخِ مشترکشان را ازنو بنویسند، فقط یک تهدید را کم نکردند؛ بلکه یک پیوستارِ بهیادسپردهٔ دگرگونیِ مشترک ساختند، آنجا که پیشتر دو پیوستارِ دشمن ایستاده بود — و با آن، زمینِ یک حسِّ مشترک.
اما چنین زمینی را چگونه میسازند، وقتی هر واژهای دربارهٔ واقعیتها همان پیامِ کهنه را با خود میکشد که دیگری در ناراستی میزید؟ اینجا باید خودِ شیوهٔ حرفزدن را عوض کرد. فرق است میانِ اینکه بگویم «چنین بود» — و بدینسان تاریخِ دیگری را دروغ اعلام کنم — یا اینکه بگویم چه دیدهام، بر من چه گذشته، چه نیاز دارم و چه میخواهم. حرفِ نخست واقعیتی را در برابرِ دیگری مینهد؛ حرفِ دوم تجربهای را باز میگوید که دیگری نمیتواند انکارش کند، چون تجربهٔ من است. هر که از ادراک و نیازِ خود بگوید، نه از تقصیرِ دیگری، حرفش را بینیش میکند، بیآنکه از موضوع دست بکشد — و به دیگری هم جا میدهد که همان کند. بخشی از این کار، پاسِ آستانههای دردِ دیگری است: آن نقطههای تاریخِ او که خاطرهٔ دردِ کشیده در آنها نشسته، بیمحافظت شکافته نمیشوند، وگرنه تهدیدِ کهنه بیدرنگ بازمیگردد و درِ تفاهم را دوباره میبندد. بدینسان از ستیزِ دو حقیقت، دادوستدِ دو تجربه پدید میآید، و تنها بر همین راه است که اصلاً میتوان تاریخی مشترک نوشت.
اما این تنها زمانی بهبار مینشیند که دستاندرکاران آن نسبتِ درگیری و فاصلهگیری را در خود بپرورند که جستارِ نخست از آن گفت. تا کسی بهکلی گرفتارِ کارِ خویش است، تصویرِ خود از گذشته را خودِ گذشته میگیرد و تاریخِ دیگری را فقط دروغ میشنود. تنها گامِ واپس — جابهجاییِ توازن اندکی بهسوی فاصلهگیری — است که میگذارد تفسیرِ خود را تفسیر ببیند و تواناش میکند که کنارِ آن، تفسیرِ دیگری را هم روا بدارد. این توان، چنانکه آنجا نشان داده شد، توانی صرفاً شخصی نیست، بلکه خصلتی تمدنی است که در فرایندهای درازِ آموختن شکل میگیرد، و اپوزیسیونی که میخواهد راه را برای دموکراسی باز کند، باید آن را در خود بپرورد. سخنِ بیخشونت و فاصلهگیریِ آموخته، اینگونه، دو ابزاریاند که زمینِ مشترک اصلاً با آنها ساخته میشود.
و چون آن ناسازگاری خود رابطهای شکل گرفته بود — چون هر اردوگاه کرامتِ خود را از نفیِ دیگری میگرفت — چیرهشدن بر آن نمیتواند صرفِ کنارِ هم چیدنِ تاریخها باشد. پیوستارِ مشترکاًساخته، گذشته را عوض نمیکند، بلکه نسبتی را که دستاندرکاران با گذشته و با یکدیگر دارند: رابطه را چنان ازنو میسازد که دیگر هیچکس ناچار نباشد ارزشِ خود را از خوارکردنِ دیگری بگیرد. در این میان، پیوستارِ مشترک تاریخهای تکتک را محو نمیکند، همانقدر که «ما»یِ فراگیر، «ما»های کوچکتر را محو نمیکند. آنها را در پیوستاری مینشاند که چندان فراخ است که میتواند حملشان کند: چنانکه تاریخِ بهیادسپردهٔ کرد و تاریخِ پارس، تاریخِ مؤمن و تاریخِ سکولار، دیگر همدیگر را همچون گذشتههای عینیِ رقیب نفی نکنند، بلکه همچون رشتههای چندگانهٔ یک شدنِ مشترک کنارِ هم بایستند. این همان روی خاطرهایِ چیزی است که در سوی نهادها، اصلِ فروکاهیِ اختیارات آن را برمیآورد: بسیاران جای خود را در آن یک مییابند، بیآنکه آن یک، آنان را محو کند.
۸.
بدینسان برپاییِ حسِّ مشترک همچون یک وظیفهٔ سیاسی بهمعنای کامل رخ مینماید. سیاستِ دموکراتیک اینگونه تعریف شد: برپایی و مدیریتِ دموکراتیکِ شرایطِ عامِ بازتولیدِ جامعه. در میانِ این شرایط، یکی هم از همه ناپیداتر است و هم از همه بنیادیتر: برپایی و نگهداشتِ خودِ جهانِ مشترک. جهانِ مشترک همان زمینِ مشترکِ واقعیتهای پذیرفتهشده و همان حسِ مشترک است، که بی آن هیچ جامعهای نمیتواند خود را همچون یک جامعه بازتولید کند. پس برپاییِ حسِّ مشترک زائدهٔ نرمِ سیاست نیست، بلکه پارهای از هستهٔ آن است — همان روی ذهنیِ شرایطِ مشترکِ بازتولید.
و به دموکراتیکشدن تعلق دارد، اگر آن را فرایندی جهتدار بدانیم. چون دموکراتیکشدن نهتنها توازنِ قدرت، بلکه توازنِ واقعیتِ تجربهشده را هم جابهجا میکند: از پیوستارهای بستهٔ پرشمارِ اردوگاهها بهسوی یک پیوستارِ گشوده و مشترک. در این پیوستار، گذشتهٔ هیچ اردوگاهی همچون گذشتهٔ عینی فرمان داده نمیشود، و هیچکدام به خاموشی کشیده نمیشود. درست در همین — در اینکه گشوده است و نه فرمانداده — فرقِ حسِّ مشترک با بدلِ آن نهفته است: پیوستارِ گشوده، گوناگونیِ نگاهها را در خود دارد؛ پیوستارِ فرمانداده، آنها را محو میکند.
اینجا هم راه همان هدف است. هر که آغاز کند تاریخِ خود را با دیگری با هم بنویسد، همینحالا همان جهانِ مشترکی را تمرین میکند که میخواهد به آن برسد. اما این تنها زیرِ یک شرط بهبار مینشیند: که آدمی بتواند تاریخِ خود را از منظرِ دیگری هم ببیند.
۹.
بدینسان جنبههای گوناگونِ فرایندِ تمدن که این جستار به آنها دست زد، به یک پیوند درمیآیند. آنها، اگر درست بنگریم، لحظههای یک روندِ واحد بودند: اعتدالِ یکنواختِ عواطف، که با آن بهجای جبرِ بیرونیِ بهخودمهاریبدلشده، خودگردانیِ آموخته مینشیند؛ جابهجاییِ توازنِ درگیری و فاصلهگیری اندکی بهسوی فاصلهگیری، که بی عقلانیشدنِ تجربهٔ حاصل از آن، هیچکس تفسیرِ خود را تفسیر نمیبیند؛ گسترشِ دامنهٔ همذاتپنداریِ آدمی با آدمی فراتر از گروهِ خودی — از نزدیکترین کس به همشهروند و، در دورترین حد، به آدمی همچون آدمی؛ فهمِ آموختهٔ بیگانه، که همدلی را نخست به رواداری میرساند؛ و درهمتنیدگیِ متقابلِ فزاینده، که همهٔ اینها را نهتنها ممکن، بلکه ناگزیر میکند. این جنبهها همچون آموزههای جداجدا کنارِ هم نمیایستند؛ آنها سویههای یکوهمان فرایندِ جهتدارِ تمدناند، که روی ذهنیِ آن، برپاییِ حسِّ مشترکِ دموکراتیک است.
سیاستی که بر پایهٔ علم بنیاد یافته، این جهت را نمیسازد، بلکه بازش میشناسد. تشخیصِ پسنگرِ آنچه ناگزیر میبایست بشود را از پیشبینیِ پیشنگرِ آنچه محتمل میتواند بشود جدا میکند، و در تحول، جهتش را میخواند — بهسوی درهمتنیدگیِ چگالترِ روابط، عاطفهٔ معتدلتر، دامنهٔ گستردهترِ همذاتپنداریِ آدمیان با یکدیگر. اما اینجا باید نکتهٔ سرنوشتساز را نگه داشت: فرایندهای اجتماعی فرایندهای طبیعی نیستند. در طبیعت قانونهای تعلیقناپذیر هست؛ در زندگیِ اجتماعی تنها قاعدهمندیها هست. قاعدهمندی قانون نیست — تا آن پیکربندیای که آن را میکشد بر جاست، بر جا میماند، و همینکه آن پیکربندی عوض شود، میگسلد. درست برای همین، فرایندهای اجتماعی بازگشتپذیرند. فرایندِ جهتدارِ دموکراتیکشدن نه تضمینشده است و نه ناممکن؛ میتوان پروراندش، و میتواند واپس بزند. درست چون بازگشتپذیر است، میطلبد که آدمی آن را در جهتش نگه دارد. همین نگهداشتِ پایداریِ جهت، وظیفهٔ اصلیِ سیاستی است که خود را علم میداند: بازشناختنِ جهت و پاسداری از آن در برابرِ خطرِ همیشهحاضرِ واپسافتادن — واپسافتادن به ذهنیتِ دژگرفته، به قومیسازی، به مکملیتِ منجمد، که پشتِ آن، واپسماندنِ منشِ اجتماعی ایستاده است.
از این چیزی برمیآید که اپوزیسیون بهآسانی از یاد میبرد. چیرهشدن بر جمهوری اسلامی با سرنگونیِ آن آغاز نمیشود. دموکراتیکشدن رخدادی نیست که در روزِ فروپاشیِ حکومتِ موجود آغاز شود؛ فرایندی است جهتدار از جابهجاییِ توازنهای قدرت به سودِ ناتوانتر، در همهٔ سطوحِ زندگیِ اجتماعی — فرایندی که یا همینحالا تمرین میشود یا اصلاً به راه نمیافتد. هر که برای آغازِ کارِ تمدنی منتظرِ سرنگونی بماند، فردای آن روز همان نسبتِ مکملیِ کهنهٔ قیمومت را زیرِ نامی تازه تکرار خواهد کرد — همان قیمومتِ سرنگونشده که همچون قیمومتی نو بازمیگردد. سرنگونی فقط لحظهٔ سیاسیِ آشکار است؛ چیرهشدن همان نهادینهشدنِ جابهجاییِ توازنهاست که باید از پیش در جریان باشد. برای همین، اپوزیسیون باید همین حالا، در همین جایگاهِ کنونیاش همچون اپوزیسیون، پیش از آنکه هیچ قدرتی داشته باشد، وظایفِ تمدنی را بر عهده بگیرد — و درست همین وظایف، خمیرمایهٔ دموکراتیکشدنِ خودِ اوست.
در درون، در ایران، این وظایف چنیناند. نخست، بازگرداندنِ کشمکشهای قومیشده و مذهبیشده از سطحِ هویت به سطحِ موضوع — به توزیعِ منابع، به بازشناسی و مشارکتِ دموکراتیک در ساماندهیِ شرایطِ عامِ بازتولیدِ جامعه — چون بر سرِ موضوعها میتوان حرف زد، اما بر سرِ تعلقِ دیگری به جامعهٔ مشترک نمیتوان. دوم، مخاطبقراردادنِ مؤمنان، دودلان، و حتی هوادارانِ حکومت همچون همشهروندانِ برابرِ آینده، نه همچون دشمن، و بدینسان گشودنِ «ما» بهجای بستنِ آن در مرزهای اردوگاهِ خودی. سوم، ساختنِ سازمانهای خودگردانِ فروکاهیدهٔ جامعهٔ مدنی از پایین، آنجا که نسبتِ متقارن میانِ برابران بهراستی تمرین میشود — همان راهپیماییِ درازِ گذر از سازمانهای جامعهٔ مدنی، که در آن دموکراسی همچون شیوهٔ زندگی تمرین میشود، پیش از آنکه شکلِ دولت شود. چهارم، آنجا که فضایی اجازه دهد، آغازِ کارِ مشترک بر سرِ پیوستارِ بهیادسپردهٔ دگرگونیِ مشترک — کارِ چیرهشدن بر قومیشدنِ تاریخِ مشترک، که اردوگاههای دشمن را از اسطورههای خاصِ خود بیرون میآورد. و پنجم، پروراندنِ اعتدالِ عاطفه و جابهجاییِ توازن بهسوی فاصلهگیری در خود، و با عقلانیشدنِ تجربه و توانِ خودبازتابی که همراهش میآید، تمرینِ همان سخنِ بیخشونت که سخنگفتن از ادراکهای خود و دیگری را ممکن میکند، بهجای سخن از تقصیرِ دیگری، و در این کار آستانههای دردِ دیگری را پاس میدارد.
به بیرون، در دیاسپورا، این وظایف چنیناند. گروههای تبعید باید نخست همان حسِّ مشترکی را که برای وطن میخواهند، در میانِ خود زندگی کنند: تمرینِ همان همپیمانیِ فراسوی مرزهای اردوگاهها که در درون هنوز ممکن نیست، و درست واردنکردنِ قومیسازی و مذهبیسازیِ کشمکشها به تبعید و تشدیدنکردنش در آنجا. آنها باید میانِ سازمانهای خود اقدامهای اعتمادساز را بهعهده بگیرند — مجامعِ مشترک، روایتهای مشترک — بهجای اینکه یکدیگر را همچون اپوزیسیونِ راستین و دروغین بکوبند. آنها باید به بیرون نه آن پاره، بلکه «ما»یِ مشترکِ آیندهٔ همهٔ شهروندان را نمایندگی کنند. و باید در برابرِ وسوسهٔ نشاندنِ فشارِ بیرونی یا حتی جنگ بهجای فرایندِ درونیِ تمدنی بایستند: چون سرنگونیای که با زورِ بیگانه بهبار آید، چیرهشدن بر حکومتِ موجود نیست، و دموکراسی را نمیتوان از بیرون نشاند — دموکراسی فرایندی است جهتدار که جهتش را تنها از درون میتوان پروراند و در پایداریاش نگه داشت.
بدینسان استدلالِ جستارِ رابطهای از خود فراتر میرود. دگرگونکردنِ پیامِ رابطهای در را میگشاید؛ برپاییِ حسِّ مشترک — واقعیتِ مشترک و حسِ مشترک — اتاقِ پشتِ آن در را میسازد؛ و تمرینِ هر دو، همین حالا و در جایگاهِ اپوزیسیون، خودْ آغازِ چیرهشدن است. چون فرایندِ جهتدار بازگشتپذیر است، جهتش نه در روزِ سرنگونی، بلکه در هر شیوهای که اردوگاهها همین امروز با هم رفتار میکنند تعیین میشود. پس برپاییِ حسِّ مشترک همان کاری است که اپوزیسیونی باید بر سرِ آن کار کند که میخواهد نهفقط بر حکومتی چیره شود، بلکه جهانِ مشترکِ یک جامعهٔ سیاسیِ شهروندانِ بالغ را بنیاد نهد — و میداند که برای این کار نباید تا پایانِ آن حکومت بماند.
منابع
Bauer, Joachim: Wie wir werden, wie wir sind. Die Entstehung des menschlichen Selbst durch Resonanz. München: Blessing 2019. — Berger, Peter L. / Luckmann, Thomas: Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 1969 (ترجمهٔ فارسی: ساخت اجتماعی واقعیت، ترجمهٔ فریبرز مجیدی، تهران: علمی و فرهنگی ۱۳۷۵). — Elias, Norbert: Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1976 (ترجمهٔ فارسی: در باب فرایند تمدن، ترجمهٔ غلامرضا خدیوی، تهران: جامعهشناسان). — Elias, Norbert: Was ist Soziologie? München: Juventa 1970 (بخشِ ۵). — Elias, Norbert: Die Symboltheorie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2001. — Fleck, Ludwik: Erfahrung und Tatsache. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1983. — Hüther, Gerald: Die Macht der inneren Bilder. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2004. — James, William: The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt 1890. — Kant, Immanuel: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In: Werkausgabe, hrsg. von Wilhelm Weischedel, Bd. III–IV. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1974 (ترجمهٔ فارسی: سنجش خردِ ناب، ترجمهٔ میرشمسالدین ادیبسلطانی، تهران: امیرکبیر ۱۳۶۲). — Moeller, Michael Lukas: Die Wahrheit beginnt zu zweit. Reinbek: Rowohlt 1988. — Rosenberg, Marshall B.: Gewaltfreie Kommunikation. Paderborn: Junfermann 2001 (ترجمهٔ فارسی: ارتباط بدون خشونت؛ زبانِ زندگی، ترجمهٔ کامران رحیمیان، تهران: اختران). — Schütz, Alfred: Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Wien: Springer 1932. — Schulz von Thun, Friedemann: Miteinander reden. Reinbek: Rowohlt 1981. — Vaihinger, Hans: Die Philosophie des Als Ob. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard 1911.
غلامآزاد، داود: دربارهٔ ضرورتِ کارِ رابطهایِ گروههای اپوزیسیون برای گذارِ دموکراتیک از جمهوری اسلامی. هانوفر ۲۰۲۶ (در دسترس در gholamasad.jimdofree.com).
هانوفر، ۲ ژوئیهٔ ۲۰۲۶
https://gholamasad.jimdofree.com/
On Freedom as Insight into Necessity
The Directed Concept of Politics and the Path as Goal
Dawud Gholamasad
I.
There are two fundamentally different ways of thinking about politics. The first credits history with a goal that stands fixed before anyone acts. It assumes that the course of things tends of its own accord toward a final state — liberation, the just commonwealth, the fall of tyranny — and that the task of those who act is merely to clear the way for this end, which is certain in any case, or to wait for it patiently. This way of thinking consoles, and for that very reason it paralyzes. Whoever holds the end to be guaranteed waits. And whoever has a certain goal before his eyes is tempted to justify any means that seems to serve it, and to sacrifice the present to a future that in truth no one has guaranteed. The supposedly certain final state releases one from responsibility for the next step.
Against this a different concept must be set: the directed one. The directedness of a development does not mean that its goal is fixed in advance. The direction lies not in an endpoint outside what happens, but in the movement itself — in the inner tendency by which a society changes, a tendency one can recognize and foster but cannot replace with a dreamed-of goal. Politics in this sense adds no goal to history. It recognizes the direction already laid down in the movement and strengthens it, and with it the steadiness of the development’s direction. Precisely here lies the insight this text is about: to foster this development is to gain insight into necessity. Freedom is then not a leap out of necessity, but necessity itself, understood and therefore open to being fostered.
II.
To recognize this direction, one must know the movement in which it works. A society is not a thing, nor a mere sum of individual people. It is a web of people who depend on one another — who are what they are only through one another, and who together form a moving whole that changes by its own rules and in which it is always also a matter of the distribution of power and self-worth, of a more and a less of weight and of the ingredients of self-worth. This web is the true frame of reference of all social life, and it is important not to break it down into separate elements set side by side.
This single web, however, does not change all of a piece, but in several respects at once — and these respects rarely move in step; each moves at its own pace. The most mobile is the net of activities and dependencies through which people need one another and earn their living — who works with whom, who depends on whom, how people find their livelihood. Heavier and slower is the fixed order of offices, laws, and forms of rule; it is, as it were, the congealed shape of that net, and it follows the net’s shifts only hesitantly. But a third respect lags furthest behind: the way people are shaped, their ingrained basic disposition — that preconscious molding which governs perceiving, judging, and acting before any conscious decision even sets in. This disposition is nothing other than the same web, insofar as it has entered into people and made them its bearers.
The non-simultaneity of these three aspects of the development is therefore not one between three separate processes, but a tension within a single web that changes at unequal speed in its different respects. And here is the decisive point: the ingrained disposition lags above all behind the changed net of activities and dependencies, not primarily behind the laws and offices. People already live in new circumstances and yet, as a rule, still carry within them the imprints of the old.
In today’s Iran this tension can be grasped with the hands. The net of activities and dependencies has advanced far: a population living in cities, schooled, young, and connected in many ways; women in education and employment; a life interwoven a thousandfold with the rest of the world. The fixed order, by contrast — the rule of religious guardianship — is held against this shift with mounting force. And the ingrained disposition still carries onward, in many places, those imprints that stem from a situation long since changed. This lagging-behind is not merely an empty gap; it has effects of its own. Whoever still carries within himself the image of the ward, who is not master of himself, generates the demand for a guardian even when the ground on which such guardianship once stood has long since fallen away. It is precisely this continuing force of what has lagged behind that gives the situation both its volatility and its direction: a disposition sustains an order that no longer matches the real condition of the people.
III.
With this one can name exactly what the ruling order is. It presents itself as a God-given reality, as a piece of creation itself, which no one has made and no one may alter. In truth, however, it is a relationship instituted by human beings. The office of the supreme jurist is, in its very form, a guardianship, modeled on the guardianship over a minor — over one who cannot manage his own affairs. It presupposes the dependent human being, and at the same time it produces him. For a guardian’s rule can exist only if the ruled carry the complementary image of themselves: the image of the religiously dependent, of those in need of guidance, of those incapable of insight of their own. Guardianship calls forth this dependence, and the dependence calls forth guardianship. Neither exists on its own; they condition one another, and this mutual conditioning is rule itself.
Herein lies, too, why this rule needs the outer enemy. A “we” in need of protection takes shape only against a threatening “they” — the foreigner, the arrogant, the enemy behind everything. Were one to remove this hostile counterpart, the protection-seeking “we” would lose its hold. The enemy is not the accidental outside of this order, but its necessary other side. So the whole is a structure of positions that condition one another — a place above all, a “we” under guardianship, and a hostile “they” — which presents itself outwardly as a single, immovable sacred thing.
To understand how a made relationship turns into a seemingly God-given thing, one must keep a simple matter in view. People often act as if something held that they know, or could know, to be no piece of finished nature but a posited assumption. A community acts as if a corporation were a person; a legal system treats something as if a case were present that is not in fact present. Such consciously posited assumptions are indispensable; without them one could neither calculate nor order nor live together. They become dangerous only when the little phrase “as if” is forgotten and the assumption turns into a supposed fact — when the posited appears as the given, the made as a necessity of nature. What a community jointly assumes and reaffirms again and again grows so firm over time that in the end no one knows any longer that it was made; it then stands there like a plain fact, the mere questioning of which already counts as sacrilege. This very transformation is the core of every lie of domination: that what human beings have instituted, and what human beings could change, comes to stand as an unalterable state of affairs.
IV.
The distribution of power just spoken of is at the same time a distribution of worth, and this calls for a look of its own. The worth of a human being, too, is nothing he could possess on his own. There is no self-worth in itself, any more than there is an “I” in itself; the worth a person has, and ascribes to himself, is each time what he is in the relations in which he is enmeshed. And into this worth power enters directly: the more power, the more worth. One’s position in the distribution of power is therefore not something alongside self-worth, but one of its essential components. Only this explains the full force of the matter — why people struggle over rank and standing with an absoluteness that mere utility cannot explain, and why one is willing even to die for honor, pride, and standing, that is, for one’s own worth.
At the level of groups this takes a definite shape. A more powerful, more tightly knit group ascribes to itself a common worth that is supposed to belong to all its members simply by their belonging — a group pride — and it ascribes to the weaker group, complementarily, a common disgrace. The two belong together like the two sides of one relationship: the pride of the one is the disgrace imposed on the other. Inwardly this pride is nourished by constant praise and mutual reinforcement; outwardly the disgrace is spread by rumor, blanket judgments, and stigma. Thus the stronger group raises its own worth by lowering that of the weaker.
The bitterest and at the same time most effective feature of this relationship is that the imposed disgrace finds an ally within the devalued themselves. The weaker often take over the image the stronger draw of them, and carry the sense of inferiority within as an inner voice; they thus become co-bearers of their own devaluation. This is the very same thing earlier called the image of one’s own dependence. Yet this relationship holds only so long as the distribution of power remains one-sided — so long as the stronger group sits securely in positions to which the weaker has no access. If the distribution of power shifts, so does the distribution of worth: the devalued can win back their worth and throw off the disgrace imposed on them.
In Iran this distribution of worth can be grasped with the hands. The ruling side ascribes to itself the higher worth — the guardians of the sacred, the pure, the stewards of God — and stamps the lower worth upon the others: the corrupt, those seduced by the foreign, the tools of the enemy. Its grasp for worth is a grasp for power, and it mobilizes the readiness to die for that worth. But this very readiness turns against it. Where people stake their lives for their own dignity and for equal worth, the imposed disgrace is thrown off; and as the distribution of power shifts, the devalued win back their worth.
Here a distinction is decisive, so that liberation does not fall back into the old form. The aim of fostering this development cannot be that those hitherto devalued become a new ruling group that sets its own pride above a new group of outsiders; that would merely reverse the poles and leave the graduated order of worth intact. The democratic turn is something else: the equal distribution of worth. It rests on two consciously posited assumptions that a democratic order gives itself and binds itself to. The first: that the dignity of every human being is inviolable. The second: that no human being is ever to be treated merely as a means, as a mere tool of an order, but always at the same time as an end, as one who bears his meaning in himself. Both are no found facts and no possession of the individual, but assumptions one holds as if they already held good, and that one realizes precisely by so holding them — assumptions whose “as if” is not forgotten but consciously and mutually maintained, and which for that very reason do not harden into a rigid idol but place one under obligation. Herein lies the opposite of guardianship, which takes the ward as an object to be administered, as a means to its order. Recognition is self-worth: to recognize one another as of age is to grant one another the same, inviolable worth, and to take one another as an end and not as a mere means. This is why, among the general conditions under which a democratic society renews itself, there belongs also the condition under which all can claim equal worth.
V.
But if the order is a made relationship, then its dissolution, too, is no mere waiting and no mere refutation of a single error, but the reshaping of a whole structure. And here an insight is decisive that runs against comfortable expectation: a human being owes the unfolding of his mind more to his enemies than to his friends. In the circle of the like-minded, in the relations of self-worth that feed a common group pride, the jointly held image only hardens; agreement is comfortable and leaves one’s own thinking untested. Only against the resistance of the opponent does what has rigidified break open again. The enemy is, as it were, the objection turned into a counterpart, against which one’s own view must break and reorient itself.
For the democratic opposition this means something precise. Its self-understanding is sharpened not in the closed circle of the already convinced, not in the applause of the like-minded, but in the friction with the opponent. The confrontation with the rulers is not only a burden; it is the school in which the opposition comes to know and correct itself. Whoever thinks only among friends repeats the inherited imprints; whoever thinks against the opponent can change them. The tension between opponents is therefore not the obstacle to the development, but the element in which it takes place.
Yet friction with the opponent is to be distinguished sharply from a camp mentality that sees in the counterpart only an enemy to be defeated and divides the world into two hostile camps. Such a mentality would merely reproduce the split into a superior “we” and a rejected “they,” and would end in the mere reversal of the poles. The democratic struggle is therefore not the war of camps, but the work of persuasion. It addresses even the opponent as someone who can be won, and not only as someone to be beaten down; it takes him as a counterpart who can be persuaded — as an end and not as a mere means — and thereby works not at the hardening of the camps but at their dissolution. Its intention is not to defeat the enemy, but to win people. For democracy is the only order that must be learned, daily and again and again; and this work of persuasion is nothing other than this continual common learning put into practice.
And this law holds for both sides. The image, too, that those under guardianship carry of themselves — the image of their own dependence — breaks open only in resistance against the guardian. Liberation begins not with the refutation of the master, but with the ruled ceasing to understand themselves as dependent. This, too, cannot be compelled but only won through persuasion — as patient work on one’s own image and on that of the other.
This thought points to a deeper, slower layer of the development — a civilizational one. The overcoming of the camp mentality goes hand in hand with the growth of the capacity for empathy and with the widening of the circle within which people identify with one another. In the camp mentality this identification ends at the boundary of one’s own group: only those who belong to the “we” count as whole human beings into whom one enters in feeling; the others, the “they,” are devalued and need not be felt with. To overcome it means to extend the reach of identification beyond group membership — to recognize and feel the human being in the opponent, in the stranger, in the outsider as well. This widening is no sudden decision, but a slow change of the ingrained disposition, of the felt relation to others; it is the civilizational side of the same movement. And it closes the circle: persuasion becomes possible at all only where identification reaches beyond one’s own group, for one can persuade only those to whom one already grants the standing of a fellow human; and only this widening prevents the mere reversal of the poles, the founding of a new “we” over a new, devalued “they.” In this sense the democratic development is a civilizational task.
VI.
From this follows a twofold task. The first is demythologization: to make the seemingly sacred, which stands there like an immovable object of devotion, recognizable again as the made relationship it conceals. It must be shown that the supposedly God-given order is a structure of three mutually conditioning positions — a place above all, a “we,” and a “they” — and that for this very reason it could also be formed otherwise.
How this demythologization works one understands once one realizes that consciousness is no resting possession, no fixed image one carries within oneself once and for all, but an unceasing stream — a continual flowing of perceptions, memories, and expectations, out of which the present forms itself anew in every moment. Domination lives by bringing this stream to a halt: it cuts a single image out of the flow of becoming and sets it up as if it were eternal, unchangeable reality itself. The rigidified sacred is precisely this — an arrested moment that passes itself off as eternity. Demythologization gives the arrested image back to the stream: it restores the awareness that the order has become and been made, a passing moment in an ongoing flow and not a timeless state; and with this it strips the supposedly unalterable of the appearance of natural necessity.
The second task is constructive, and it calls for a different kind of assumption. Democracy, too, rests on posited assumptions — but on such as one does not pass off as finished nature, but holds consciously as posited, and toward whose realization one works: that all citizens are equal, that the people is the bearer of power, that a common will is possible. These assumptions are no less made than those of guardianship. But they are held consciously for what they are — as regulative fictions, as assumptions one treats as if they already held good. They remain testable and reversible instead of rigidified, and above all they are set upon reciprocity, or they are nothing. My acting as if I were of age is groundless without the other’s recognition of my adulthood and my recognition of his. The democratic “we” forms itself not over a “we” placed under guardianship beneath a place above all, and not against an outer hostile “they,” but through the mutual recognition of “I” and “you” as of age — which is at the same time the granting of equal worth — and with the reversibility of positions, in which the ruled can become rulers and again become ruled.
This reversibility of the whole structure is nothing other than what democratic politics is in its essence: the democratic production and operation of the general conditions for the reproduction of society, both within the state and between states. By this is meant that a society does not leave to a place above all the conditions under which it renews and sustains itself day by day — within itself and in relation to other states — but produces and conducts them jointly and for all.
VII.
With this it becomes intelligible why the path itself is the goal. Where directedness takes the place of an orientation toward a final state, there is no longer any goal lying outside the process toward which the path merely runs and in which it comes to a standstill. The production and operation of the general conditions for the reproduction of society are never completed. They take place as an ongoing process, in which solidified relations must again and again be carried over into reciprocal and reversible ones. Freedom is therefore no attained state that would set in and end the walking. It is the understood and fostered condition for people’s being able to widen their own scope of action and decision. The consciously and mutually held democratic regulative fiction of individual freedom is not a means to a later end, but the exercise in which freedom is produced, present each time — as the continual widening of precisely these scopes. Whoever waits for the final state has already lost; whoever, in the walking, produces the conditions of mutual adulthood is already, on the way, free and of equal worth.
The task of the democratic opposition is therefore not to bring about a guaranteed end, but to recognize and foster the direction of the development: to bring the advanced net of activities and dependencies, and the lagging disposition that still carries the rigidified image of guardianship, into a tension that resolves in favor of adulthood. This is slow work, for the bond is deeply ingrained on both sides; it never suffices to see through the myth of rule so long as the image of one’s own dependence is not laid aside. But this very work is freedom itself in the carrying-out. Insight into necessity does not mean bowing to a teleological necessity — to the notion of a predetermined goal — but understanding the regularity of the direction of development and clearing the way, in one’s own action, for its steadiness. And on this path, not at its dreamed-of end, the self-governing commonwealth begins.
On the Intellectual Background
The body of the text presupposes no prior knowledge and names no names; the load-bearing thoughts rest on a number of sources, which may be acknowledged here. The notion of posited, consciously held assumptions (“as if”) and their hardening into dogma goes back to Hans Vaihinger; its social development — the communal bringing-forth of what later appears as mere fact — to Ludwik Fleck and to the social-constructionist sociology of knowledge. The thought that there is no “I” in itself, because the bearing word exists only as a pair (I-Thou, I-It), comes from Martin Buber. The web of interdependent human beings, the series of personal pronouns as its model, the balances of power, and the figure of the established and the outsiders, together with the relations of self-worth among individuals and groups — group pride and group disgrace — are taken from Norbert Elias; the civilizational thought, the growth of the capacity for empathy and the widening of the reach of mutual identification beyond one’s own group, from his theory of the civilizing process. The conception of consciousness as an unceasing stream goes back to William James; to it corresponds, in figurational sociology, the remembered continuum of change. That the dignity of every human being is inviolable, and that the human being is always to be treated at the same time as an end and never merely as a means, are here construed as regulative fictions — the first following the first article of the Basic Law, the second following Immanuel Kant. That the democratic struggle is the work of persuasion which overcomes every camp mentality, and that democracy is a form of life that must be learned anew each day, follows Oskar Negt. The sentence that a human being owes the unfolding of his mind more to his enemies than to his friends is, again, Vaihinger’s. The concept of freedom as understood necessity has its older root in Spinoza and in the tradition continued by Hegel and Marx; the lag-effect of the ingrained disposition is developed following Marx.
References
Berger, Peter L. / Luckmann, Thomas: The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Doubleday 1966.
Buber, Martin: I and Thou (Ich und Du, 1923).
Elias, Norbert: The Civilizing Process (Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, 1939).
Elias, Norbert: What Is Sociology? (Was ist Soziologie? 1970).
Elias, Norbert: The Society of Individuals (Die Gesellschaft der Individuen, 1987).
Elias, Norbert / Scotson, John L.: The Established and the Outsiders. London: Frank Cass 1965.
Fleck, Ludwik: Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache, 1935).
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830).
James, William: The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt 1890.
Kant, Immanuel: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785).
Marx, Karl: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).
Negt, Oskar: Der politische Mensch. Demokratie als Lebensform [The Political Human Being: Democracy as a Form of Life]. Göttingen: Steidl 2010.
Spinoza, Baruch de: Ethics (1677).
Vaihinger, Hans: The Philosophy of “As If” (Die Philosophie des Als Ob, 1911).
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949, Article 1(1).
Hanover, 25 June 2026
https://gholamasad.jimdofree.com/
On Freedom as Insight into Necessity
The Directed Concept of Politics and the Path as Goal
Dawud Gholamasad
I.
There are two fundamentally different ways of thinking about politics. The first credits history with a goal that stands fixed before anyone acts. It assumes that the course of things tends of its own accord toward a final state — liberation, the just commonwealth, the fall of tyranny — and that the task of those who act is merely to clear the way for this end, which is certain in any case, or to wait for it patiently. This way of thinking consoles, and for that very reason it paralyzes. Whoever holds the end to be guaranteed waits. And whoever has a certain goal before his eyes is tempted to justify any means that seems to serve it, and to sacrifice the present to a future that in truth no one has guaranteed. The supposedly certain final state releases one from responsibility for the next step.
Against this a different concept must be set: the directed one. The directedness of a development does not mean that its goal is fixed in advance. The direction lies not in an endpoint outside what happens, but in the movement itself — in the inner tendency by which a society changes, a tendency one can recognize and foster but cannot replace with a dreamed-of goal. Politics in this sense adds no goal to history. It recognizes the direction already laid down in the movement and strengthens it, and with it the steadiness of the development’s direction. Precisely here lies the insight this text is about: to foster this development is to gain insight into necessity. Freedom is then not a leap out of necessity, but necessity itself, understood and therefore open to being fostered.
II.
To recognize this direction, one must know the movement in which it works. A society is not a thing, nor a mere sum of individual people. It is a web of people who depend on one another — who are what they are only through one another, and who together form a moving whole that changes by its own rules and in which it is always also a matter of the distribution of power and self-worth, of a more and a less of weight and of the ingredients of self-worth. This web is the true frame of reference of all social life, and it is important not to break it down into separate elements set side by side.
This single web, however, does not change all of a piece, but in several respects at once — and these respects rarely move in step; each moves at its own pace. The most mobile is the net of activities and dependencies through which people need one another and earn their living — who works with whom, who depends on whom, how people find their livelihood. Heavier and slower is the fixed order of offices, laws, and forms of rule; it is, as it were, the congealed shape of that net, and it follows the net’s shifts only hesitantly. But a third respect lags furthest behind: the way people are shaped, their ingrained basic disposition — that preconscious molding which governs perceiving, judging, and acting before any conscious decision even sets in. This disposition is nothing other than the same web, insofar as it has entered into people and made them its bearers.
The non-simultaneity of these three aspects of the development is therefore not one between three separate processes, but a tension within a single web that changes at unequal speed in its different respects. And here is the decisive point: the ingrained disposition lags above all behind the changed net of activities and dependencies, not primarily behind the laws and offices. People already live in new circumstances and yet, as a rule, still carry within them the imprints of the old.
In today’s Iran this tension can be grasped with the hands. The net of activities and dependencies has advanced far: a population living in cities, schooled, young, and connected in many ways; women in education and employment; a life interwoven a thousandfold with the rest of the world. The fixed order, by contrast — the rule of religious guardianship — is held against this shift with mounting force. And the ingrained disposition still carries onward, in many places, those imprints that stem from a situation long since changed. This lagging-behind is not merely an empty gap; it has effects of its own. Whoever still carries within himself the image of the ward, who is not master of himself, generates the demand for a guardian even when the ground on which such guardianship once stood has long since fallen away. It is precisely this continuing force of what has lagged behind that gives the situation both its volatility and its direction: a disposition sustains an order that no longer matches the real condition of the people.
III.
With this one can name exactly what the ruling order is. It presents itself as a God-given reality, as a piece of creation itself, which no one has made and no one may alter. In truth, however, it is a relationship instituted by human beings. The office of the supreme jurist is, in its very form, a guardianship, modeled on the guardianship over a minor — over one who cannot manage his own affairs. It presupposes the dependent human being, and at the same time it produces him. For a guardian’s rule can exist only if the ruled carry the complementary image of themselves: the image of the religiously dependent, of those in need of guidance, of those incapable of insight of their own. Guardianship calls forth this dependence, and the dependence calls forth guardianship. Neither exists on its own; they condition one another, and this mutual conditioning is rule itself.
Herein lies, too, why this rule needs the outer enemy. A “we” in need of protection takes shape only against a threatening “they” — the foreigner, the arrogant, the enemy behind everything. Were one to remove this hostile counterpart, the protection-seeking “we” would lose its hold. The enemy is not the accidental outside of this order, but its necessary other side. So the whole is a structure of positions that condition one another — a place above all, a “we” under guardianship, and a hostile “they” — which presents itself outwardly as a single, immovable sacred thing.
To understand how a made relationship turns into a seemingly God-given thing, one must keep a simple matter in view. People often act as if something held that they know, or could know, to be no piece of finished nature but a posited assumption. A community acts as if a corporation were a person; a legal system treats something as if a case were present that is not in fact present. Such consciously posited assumptions are indispensable; without them one could neither calculate nor order nor live together. They become dangerous only when the little phrase “as if” is forgotten and the assumption turns into a supposed fact — when the posited appears as the given, the made as a necessity of nature. What a community jointly assumes and reaffirms again and again grows so firm over time that in the end no one knows any longer that it was made; it then stands there like a plain fact, the mere questioning of which already counts as sacrilege. This very transformation is the core of every lie of domination: that what human beings have instituted, and what human beings could change, comes to stand as an unalterable state of affairs.
IV.
The distribution of power just spoken of is at the same time a distribution of worth, and this calls for a look of its own. The worth of a human being, too, is nothing he could possess on his own. There is no self-worth in itself, any more than there is an “I” in itself; the worth a person has, and ascribes to himself, is each time what he is in the relations in which he is enmeshed. And into this worth power enters directly: the more power, the more worth. One’s position in the distribution of power is therefore not something alongside self-worth, but one of its essential components. Only this explains the full force of the matter — why people struggle over rank and standing with an absoluteness that mere utility cannot explain, and why one is willing even to die for honor, pride, and standing, that is, for one’s own worth.
At the level of groups this takes a definite shape. A more powerful, more tightly knit group ascribes to itself a common worth that is supposed to belong to all its members simply by their belonging — a group pride — and it ascribes to the weaker group, complementarily, a common disgrace. The two belong together like the two sides of one relationship: the pride of the one is the disgrace imposed on the other. Inwardly this pride is nourished by constant praise and mutual reinforcement; outwardly the disgrace is spread by rumor, blanket judgments, and stigma. Thus the stronger group raises its own worth by lowering that of the weaker.
The bitterest and at the same time most effective feature of this relationship is that the imposed disgrace finds an ally within the devalued themselves. The weaker often take over the image the stronger draw of them, and carry the sense of inferiority within as an inner voice; they thus become co-bearers of their own devaluation. This is the very same thing earlier called the image of one’s own dependence. Yet this relationship holds only so long as the distribution of power remains one-sided — so long as the stronger group sits securely in positions to which the weaker has no access. If the distribution of power shifts, so does the distribution of worth: the devalued can win back their worth and throw off the disgrace imposed on them.
In Iran this distribution of worth can be grasped with the hands. The ruling side ascribes to itself the higher worth — the guardians of the sacred, the pure, the stewards of God — and stamps the lower worth upon the others: the corrupt, those seduced by the foreign, the tools of the enemy. Its grasp for worth is a grasp for power, and it mobilizes the readiness to die for that worth. But this very readiness turns against it. Where people stake their lives for their own dignity and for equal worth, the imposed disgrace is thrown off; and as the distribution of power shifts, the devalued win back their worth.
Here a distinction is decisive, so that liberation does not fall back into the old form. The aim of fostering this development cannot be that those hitherto devalued become a new ruling group that sets its own pride above a new group of outsiders; that would merely reverse the poles and leave the graduated order of worth intact. The democratic turn is something else: the equal distribution of worth. It rests on two consciously posited assumptions that a democratic order gives itself and binds itself to. The first: that the dignity of every human being is inviolable. The second: that no human being is ever to be treated merely as a means, as a mere tool of an order, but always at the same time as an end, as one who bears his meaning in himself. Both are no found facts and no possession of the individual, but assumptions one holds as if they already held good, and that one realizes precisely by so holding them — assumptions whose “as if” is not forgotten but consciously and mutually maintained, and which for that very reason do not harden into a rigid idol but place one under obligation. Herein lies the opposite of guardianship, which takes the ward as an object to be administered, as a means to its order. Recognition is self-worth: to recognize one another as of age is to grant one another the same, inviolable worth, and to take one another as an end and not as a mere means. This is why, among the general conditions under which a democratic society renews itself, there belongs also the condition under which all can claim equal worth.
V.
But if the order is a made relationship, then its dissolution, too, is no mere waiting and no mere refutation of a single error, but the reshaping of a whole structure. And here an insight is decisive that runs against comfortable expectation: a human being owes the unfolding of his mind more to his enemies than to his friends. In the circle of the like-minded, in the relations of self-worth that feed a common group pride, the jointly held image only hardens; agreement is comfortable and leaves one’s own thinking untested. Only against the resistance of the opponent does what has rigidified break open again. The enemy is, as it were, the objection turned into a counterpart, against which one’s own view must break and reorient itself.
For the democratic opposition this means something precise. Its self-understanding is sharpened not in the closed circle of the already convinced, not in the applause of the like-minded, but in the friction with the opponent. The confrontation with the rulers is not only a burden; it is the school in which the opposition comes to know and correct itself. Whoever thinks only among friends repeats the inherited imprints; whoever thinks against the opponent can change them. The tension between opponents is therefore not the obstacle to the development, but the element in which it takes place.
Yet friction with the opponent is to be distinguished sharply from a camp mentality that sees in the counterpart only an enemy to be defeated and divides the world into two hostile camps. Such a mentality would merely reproduce the split into a superior “we” and a rejected “they,” and would end in the mere reversal of the poles. The democratic struggle is therefore not the war of camps, but the work of persuasion. It addresses even the opponent as someone who can be won, and not only as someone to be beaten down; it takes him as a counterpart who can be persuaded — as an end and not as a mere means — and thereby works not at the hardening of the camps but at their dissolution. Its intention is not to defeat the enemy, but to win people. For democracy is the only order that must be learned, daily and again and again; and this work of persuasion is nothing other than this continual common learning put into practice.
And this law holds for both sides. The image, too, that those under guardianship carry of themselves — the image of their own dependence — breaks open only in resistance against the guardian. Liberation begins not with the refutation of the master, but with the ruled ceasing to understand themselves as dependent. This, too, cannot be compelled but only won through persuasion — as patient work on one’s own image and on that of the other.
This thought points to a deeper, slower layer of the development — a civilizational one. The overcoming of the camp mentality goes hand in hand with the growth of the capacity for empathy and with the widening of the circle within which people identify with one another. In the camp mentality this identification ends at the boundary of one’s own group: only those who belong to the “we” count as whole human beings into whom one enters in feeling; the others, the “they,” are devalued and need not be felt with. To overcome it means to extend the reach of identification beyond group membership — to recognize and feel the human being in the opponent, in the stranger, in the outsider as well. This widening is no sudden decision, but a slow change of the ingrained disposition, of the felt relation to others; it is the civilizational side of the same movement. And it closes the circle: persuasion becomes possible at all only where identification reaches beyond one’s own group, for one can persuade only those to whom one already grants the standing of a fellow human; and only this widening prevents the mere reversal of the poles, the founding of a new “we” over a new, devalued “they.” In this sense the democratic development is a civilizational task.
VI.
From this follows a twofold task. The first is demythologization: to make the seemingly sacred, which stands there like an immovable object of devotion, recognizable again as the made relationship it conceals. It must be shown that the supposedly God-given order is a structure of three mutually conditioning positions — a place above all, a “we,” and a “they” — and that for this very reason it could also be formed otherwise.
How this demythologization works one understands once one realizes that consciousness is no resting possession, no fixed image one carries within oneself once and for all, but an unceasing stream — a continual flowing of perceptions, memories, and expectations, out of which the present forms itself anew in every moment. Domination lives by bringing this stream to a halt: it cuts a single image out of the flow of becoming and sets it up as if it were eternal, unchangeable reality itself. The rigidified sacred is precisely this — an arrested moment that passes itself off as eternity. Demythologization gives the arrested image back to the stream: it restores the awareness that the order has become and been made, a passing moment in an ongoing flow and not a timeless state; and with this it strips the supposedly unalterable of the appearance of natural necessity.
The second task is constructive, and it calls for a different kind of assumption. Democracy, too, rests on posited assumptions — but on such as one does not pass off as finished nature, but holds consciously as posited, and toward whose realization one works: that all citizens are equal, that the people is the bearer of power, that a common will is possible. These assumptions are no less made than those of guardianship. But they are held consciously for what they are — as regulative fictions, as assumptions one treats as if they already held good. They remain testable and reversible instead of rigidified, and above all they are set upon reciprocity, or they are nothing. My acting as if I were of age is groundless without the other’s recognition of my adulthood and my recognition of his. The democratic “we” forms itself not over a “we” placed under guardianship beneath a place above all, and not against an outer hostile “they,” but through the mutual recognition of “I” and “you” as of age — which is at the same time the granting of equal worth — and with the reversibility of positions, in which the ruled can become rulers and again become ruled.
This reversibility of the whole structure is nothing other than what democratic politics is in its essence: the democratic production and operation of the general conditions for the reproduction of society, both within the state and between states. By this is meant that a society does not leave to a place above all the conditions under which it renews and sustains itself day by day — within itself and in relation to other states — but produces and conducts them jointly and for all.
VII.
With this it becomes intelligible why the path itself is the goal. Where directedness takes the place of an orientation toward a final state, there is no longer any goal lying outside the process toward which the path merely runs and in which it comes to a standstill. The production and operation of the general conditions for the reproduction of society are never completed. They take place as an ongoing process, in which solidified relations must again and again be carried over into reciprocal and reversible ones. Freedom is therefore no attained state that would set in and end the walking. It is the understood and fostered condition for people’s being able to widen their own scope of action and decision. The consciously and mutually held democratic regulative fiction of individual freedom is not a means to a later end, but the exercise in which freedom is produced, present each time — as the continual widening of precisely these scopes. Whoever waits for the final state has already lost; whoever, in the walking, produces the conditions of mutual adulthood is already, on the way, free and of equal worth.
The task of the democratic opposition is therefore not to bring about a guaranteed end, but to recognize and foster the direction of the development: to bring the advanced net of activities and dependencies, and the lagging disposition that still carries the rigidified image of guardianship, into a tension that resolves in favor of adulthood. This is slow work, for the bond is deeply ingrained on both sides; it never suffices to see through the myth of rule so long as the image of one’s own dependence is not laid aside. But this very work is freedom itself in the carrying-out. Insight into necessity does not mean bowing to a teleological necessity — to the notion of a predetermined goal — but understanding the regularity of the direction of development and clearing the way, in one’s own action, for its steadiness. And on this path, not at its dreamed-of end, the self-governing commonwealth begins.
On the Intellectual Background
The body of the text presupposes no prior knowledge and names no names; the load-bearing thoughts rest on a number of sources, which may be acknowledged here. The notion of posited, consciously held assumptions (“as if”) and their hardening into dogma goes back to Hans Vaihinger; its social development — the communal bringing-forth of what later appears as mere fact — to Ludwik Fleck and to the social-constructionist sociology of knowledge. The thought that there is no “I” in itself, because the bearing word exists only as a pair (I-Thou, I-It), comes from Martin Buber. The web of interdependent human beings, the series of personal pronouns as its model, the balances of power, and the figure of the established and the outsiders, together with the relations of self-worth among individuals and groups — group pride and group disgrace — are taken from Norbert Elias; the civilizational thought, the growth of the capacity for empathy and the widening of the reach of mutual identification beyond one’s own group, from his theory of the civilizing process. The conception of consciousness as an unceasing stream goes back to William James; to it corresponds, in figurational sociology, the remembered continuum of change. That the dignity of every human being is inviolable, and that the human being is always to be treated at the same time as an end and never merely as a means, are here construed as regulative fictions — the first following the first article of the Basic Law, the second following Immanuel Kant. That the democratic struggle is the work of persuasion which overcomes every camp mentality, and that democracy is a form of life that must be learned anew each day, follows Oskar Negt. The sentence that a human being owes the unfolding of his mind more to his enemies than to his friends is, again, Vaihinger’s. The concept of freedom as understood necessity has its older root in Spinoza and in the tradition continued by Hegel and Marx; the lag-effect of the ingrained disposition is developed following Marx.
References
Berger, Peter L. / Luckmann, Thomas: The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Doubleday 1966.
Buber, Martin: I and Thou (Ich und Du, 1923).
Elias, Norbert: The Civilizing Process (Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, 1939).
Elias, Norbert: What Is Sociology? (Was ist Soziologie? 1970).
Elias, Norbert: The Society of Individuals (Die Gesellschaft der Individuen, 1987).
Elias, Norbert / Scotson, John L.: The Established and the Outsiders. London: Frank Cass 1965.
Fleck, Ludwik: Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache, 1935).
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830).
James, William: The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt 1890.
Kant, Immanuel: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785).
Marx, Karl: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).
Negt, Oskar: Der politische Mensch. Demokratie als Lebensform [The Political Human Being: Democracy as a Form of Life]. Göttingen: Steidl 2010.
Spinoza, Baruch de: Ethics (1677).
Vaihinger, Hans: The Philosophy of “As If” (Die Philosophie des Als Ob, 1911).
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949, Article 1(1).
Hanover, 25 June 2026
https://gholamasad.jimdofree.com/
On Freedom as Insight into Necessity
The Directed Concept of Politics and the Path as Goal
Dawud Gholamasad
I.
There are two fundamentally different ways of thinking about politics. The first credits history with a goal that stands fixed before anyone acts. It assumes that the course of things tends of its own accord toward a final state — liberation, the just commonwealth, the fall of tyranny — and that the task of those who act is merely to clear the way for this end, which is certain in any case, or to wait for it patiently. This way of thinking consoles, and for that very reason it paralyzes. Whoever holds the end to be guaranteed waits. And whoever has a certain goal before his eyes is tempted to justify any means that seems to serve it, and to sacrifice the present to a future that in truth no one has guaranteed. The supposedly certain final state releases one from responsibility for the next step.
Against this a different concept must be set: the directed one. The directedness of a development does not mean that its goal is fixed in advance. The direction lies not in an endpoint outside what happens, but in the movement itself — in the inner tendency by which a society changes, a tendency one can recognize and foster but cannot replace with a dreamed-of goal. Politics in this sense adds no goal to history. It recognizes the direction already laid down in the movement and strengthens it, and with it the steadiness of the development’s direction. Precisely here lies the insight this text is about: to foster this development is to gain insight into necessity. Freedom is then not a leap out of necessity, but necessity itself, understood and therefore open to being fostered.
II.
To recognize this direction, one must know the movement in which it works. A society is not a thing, nor a mere sum of individual people. It is a web of people who depend on one another — who are what they are only through one another, and who together form a moving whole that changes by its own rules and in which it is always also a matter of the distribution of power and self-worth, of a more and a less of weight and of the ingredients of self-worth. This web is the true frame of reference of all social life, and it is important not to break it down into separate elements set side by side.
This single web, however, does not change all of a piece, but in several respects at once — and these respects rarely move in step; each moves at its own pace. The most mobile is the net of activities and dependencies through which people need one another and earn their living — who works with whom, who depends on whom, how people find their livelihood. Heavier and slower is the fixed order of offices, laws, and forms of rule; it is, as it were, the congealed shape of that net, and it follows the net’s shifts only hesitantly. But a third respect lags furthest behind: the way people are shaped, their ingrained basic disposition — that preconscious molding which governs perceiving, judging, and acting before any conscious decision even sets in. This disposition is nothing other than the same web, insofar as it has entered into people and made them its bearers.
The non-simultaneity of these three aspects of the development is therefore not one between three separate processes, but a tension within a single web that changes at unequal speed in its different respects. And here is the decisive point: the ingrained disposition lags above all behind the changed net of activities and dependencies, not primarily behind the laws and offices. People already live in new circumstances and yet, as a rule, still carry within them the imprints of the old.
In today’s Iran this tension can be grasped with the hands. The net of activities and dependencies has advanced far: a population living in cities, schooled, young, and connected in many ways; women in education and employment; a life interwoven a thousandfold with the rest of the world. The fixed order, by contrast — the rule of religious guardianship — is held against this shift with mounting force. And the ingrained disposition still carries onward, in many places, those imprints that stem from a situation long since changed. This lagging-behind is not merely an empty gap; it has effects of its own. Whoever still carries within himself the image of the ward, who is not master of himself, generates the demand for a guardian even when the ground on which such guardianship once stood has long since fallen away. It is precisely this continuing force of what has lagged behind that gives the situation both its volatility and its direction: a disposition sustains an order that no longer matches the real condition of the people.
III.
With this one can name exactly what the ruling order is. It presents itself as a God-given reality, as a piece of creation itself, which no one has made and no one may alter. In truth, however, it is a relationship instituted by human beings. The office of the supreme jurist is, in its very form, a guardianship, modeled on the guardianship over a minor — over one who cannot manage his own affairs. It presupposes the dependent human being, and at the same time it produces him. For a guardian’s rule can exist only if the ruled carry the complementary image of themselves: the image of the religiously dependent, of those in need of guidance, of those incapable of insight of their own. Guardianship calls forth this dependence, and the dependence calls forth guardianship. Neither exists on its own; they condition one another, and this mutual conditioning is rule itself.
Herein lies, too, why this rule needs the outer enemy. A “we” in need of protection takes shape only against a threatening “they” — the foreigner, the arrogant, the enemy behind everything. Were one to remove this hostile counterpart, the protection-seeking “we” would lose its hold. The enemy is not the accidental outside of this order, but its necessary other side. So the whole is a structure of positions that condition one another — a place above all, a “we” under guardianship, and a hostile “they” — which presents itself outwardly as a single, immovable sacred thing.
To understand how a made relationship turns into a seemingly God-given thing, one must keep a simple matter in view. People often act as if something held that they know, or could know, to be no piece of finished nature but a posited assumption. A community acts as if a corporation were a person; a legal system treats something as if a case were present that is not in fact present. Such consciously posited assumptions are indispensable; without them one could neither calculate nor order nor live together. They become dangerous only when the little phrase “as if” is forgotten and the assumption turns into a supposed fact — when the posited appears as the given, the made as a necessity of nature. What a community jointly assumes and reaffirms again and again grows so firm over time that in the end no one knows any longer that it was made; it then stands there like a plain fact, the mere questioning of which already counts as sacrilege. This very transformation is the core of every lie of domination: that what human beings have instituted, and what human beings could change, comes to stand as an unalterable state of affairs.
IV.
The distribution of power just spoken of is at the same time a distribution of worth, and this calls for a look of its own. The worth of a human being, too, is nothing he could possess on his own. There is no self-worth in itself, any more than there is an “I” in itself; the worth a person has, and ascribes to himself, is each time what he is in the relations in which he is enmeshed. And into this worth power enters directly: the more power, the more worth. One’s position in the distribution of power is therefore not something alongside self-worth, but one of its essential components. Only this explains the full force of the matter — why people struggle over rank and standing with an absoluteness that mere utility cannot explain, and why one is willing even to die for honor, pride, and standing, that is, for one’s own worth.
At the level of groups this takes a definite shape. A more powerful, more tightly knit group ascribes to itself a common worth that is supposed to belong to all its members simply by their belonging — a group pride — and it ascribes to the weaker group, complementarily, a common disgrace. The two belong together like the two sides of one relationship: the pride of the one is the disgrace imposed on the other. Inwardly this pride is nourished by constant praise and mutual reinforcement; outwardly the disgrace is spread by rumor, blanket judgments, and stigma. Thus the stronger group raises its own worth by lowering that of the weaker.
The bitterest and at the same time most effective feature of this relationship is that the imposed disgrace finds an ally within the devalued themselves. The weaker often take over the image the stronger draw of them, and carry the sense of inferiority within as an inner voice; they thus become co-bearers of their own devaluation. This is the very same thing earlier called the image of one’s own dependence. Yet this relationship holds only so long as the distribution of power remains one-sided — so long as the stronger group sits securely in positions to which the weaker has no access. If the distribution of power shifts, so does the distribution of worth: the devalued can win back their worth and throw off the disgrace imposed on them.
In Iran this distribution of worth can be grasped with the hands. The ruling side ascribes to itself the higher worth — the guardians of the sacred, the pure, the stewards of God — and stamps the lower worth upon the others: the corrupt, those seduced by the foreign, the tools of the enemy. Its grasp for worth is a grasp for power, and it mobilizes the readiness to die for that worth. But this very readiness turns against it. Where people stake their lives for their own dignity and for equal worth, the imposed disgrace is thrown off; and as the distribution of power shifts, the devalued win back their worth.
Here a distinction is decisive, so that liberation does not fall back into the old form. The aim of fostering this development cannot be that those hitherto devalued become a new ruling group that sets its own pride above a new group of outsiders; that would merely reverse the poles and leave the graduated order of worth intact. The democratic turn is something else: the equal distribution of worth. It rests on two consciously posited assumptions that a democratic order gives itself and binds itself to. The first: that the dignity of every human being is inviolable. The second: that no human being is ever to be treated merely as a means, as a mere tool of an order, but always at the same time as an end, as one who bears his meaning in himself. Both are no found facts and no possession of the individual, but assumptions one holds as if they already held good, and that one realizes precisely by so holding them — assumptions whose “as if” is not forgotten but consciously and mutually maintained, and which for that very reason do not harden into a rigid idol but place one under obligation. Herein lies the opposite of guardianship, which takes the ward as an object to be administered, as a means to its order. Recognition is self-worth: to recognize one another as of age is to grant one another the same, inviolable worth, and to take one another as an end and not as a mere means. This is why, among the general conditions under which a democratic society renews itself, there belongs also the condition under which all can claim equal worth.
V.
But if the order is a made relationship, then its dissolution, too, is no mere waiting and no mere refutation of a single error, but the reshaping of a whole structure. And here an insight is decisive that runs against comfortable expectation: a human being owes the unfolding of his mind more to his enemies than to his friends. In the circle of the like-minded, in the relations of self-worth that feed a common group pride, the jointly held image only hardens; agreement is comfortable and leaves one’s own thinking untested. Only against the resistance of the opponent does what has rigidified break open again. The enemy is, as it were, the objection turned into a counterpart, against which one’s own view must break and reorient itself.
For the democratic opposition this means something precise. Its self-understanding is sharpened not in the closed circle of the already convinced, not in the applause of the like-minded, but in the friction with the opponent. The confrontation with the rulers is not only a burden; it is the school in which the opposition comes to know and correct itself. Whoever thinks only among friends repeats the inherited imprints; whoever thinks against the opponent can change them. The tension between opponents is therefore not the obstacle to the development, but the element in which it takes place.
Yet friction with the opponent is to be distinguished sharply from a camp mentality that sees in the counterpart only an enemy to be defeated and divides the world into two hostile camps. Such a mentality would merely reproduce the split into a superior “we” and a rejected “they,” and would end in the mere reversal of the poles. The democratic struggle is therefore not the war of camps, but the work of persuasion. It addresses even the opponent as someone who can be won, and not only as someone to be beaten down; it takes him as a counterpart who can be persuaded — as an end and not as a mere means — and thereby works not at the hardening of the camps but at their dissolution. Its intention is not to defeat the enemy, but to win people. For democracy is the only order that must be learned, daily and again and again; and this work of persuasion is nothing other than this continual common learning put into practice.
And this law holds for both sides. The image, too, that those under guardianship carry of themselves — the image of their own dependence — breaks open only in resistance against the guardian. Liberation begins not with the refutation of the master, but with the ruled ceasing to understand themselves as dependent. This, too, cannot be compelled but only won through persuasion — as patient work on one’s own image and on that of the other.
This thought points to a deeper, slower layer of the development — a civilizational one. The overcoming of the camp mentality goes hand in hand with the growth of the capacity for empathy and with the widening of the circle within which people identify with one another. In the camp mentality this identification ends at the boundary of one’s own group: only those who belong to the “we” count as whole human beings into whom one enters in feeling; the others, the “they,” are devalued and need not be felt with. To overcome it means to extend the reach of identification beyond group membership — to recognize and feel the human being in the opponent, in the stranger, in the outsider as well. This widening is no sudden decision, but a slow change of the ingrained disposition, of the felt relation to others; it is the civilizational side of the same movement. And it closes the circle: persuasion becomes possible at all only where identification reaches beyond one’s own group, for one can persuade only those to whom one already grants the standing of a fellow human; and only this widening prevents the mere reversal of the poles, the founding of a new “we” over a new, devalued “they.” In this sense the democratic development is a civilizational task.
VI.
From this follows a twofold task. The first is demythologization: to make the seemingly sacred, which stands there like an immovable object of devotion, recognizable again as the made relationship it conceals. It must be shown that the supposedly God-given order is a structure of three mutually conditioning positions — a place above all, a “we,” and a “they” — and that for this very reason it could also be formed otherwise.
How this demythologization works one understands once one realizes that consciousness is no resting possession, no fixed image one carries within oneself once and for all, but an unceasing stream — a continual flowing of perceptions, memories, and expectations, out of which the present forms itself anew in every moment. Domination lives by bringing this stream to a halt: it cuts a single image out of the flow of becoming and sets it up as if it were eternal, unchangeable reality itself. The rigidified sacred is precisely this — an arrested moment that passes itself off as eternity. Demythologization gives the arrested image back to the stream: it restores the awareness that the order has become and been made, a passing moment in an ongoing flow and not a timeless state; and with this it strips the supposedly unalterable of the appearance of natural necessity.
The second task is constructive, and it calls for a different kind of assumption. Democracy, too, rests on posited assumptions — but on such as one does not pass off as finished nature, but holds consciously as posited, and toward whose realization one works: that all citizens are equal, that the people is the bearer of power, that a common will is possible. These assumptions are no less made than those of guardianship. But they are held consciously for what they are — as regulative fictions, as assumptions one treats as if they already held good. They remain testable and reversible instead of rigidified, and above all they are set upon reciprocity, or they are nothing. My acting as if I were of age is groundless without the other’s recognition of my adulthood and my recognition of his. The democratic “we” forms itself not over a “we” placed under guardianship beneath a place above all, and not against an outer hostile “they,” but through the mutual recognition of “I” and “you” as of age — which is at the same time the granting of equal worth — and with the reversibility of positions, in which the ruled can become rulers and again become ruled.
This reversibility of the whole structure is nothing other than what democratic politics is in its essence: the democratic production and operation of the general conditions for the reproduction of society, both within the state and between states. By this is meant that a society does not leave to a place above all the conditions under which it renews and sustains itself day by day — within itself and in relation to other states — but produces and conducts them jointly and for all.
VII.
With this it becomes intelligible why the path itself is the goal. Where directedness takes the place of an orientation toward a final state, there is no longer any goal lying outside the process toward which the path merely runs and in which it comes to a standstill. The production and operation of the general conditions for the reproduction of society are never completed. They take place as an ongoing process, in which solidified relations must again and again be carried over into reciprocal and reversible ones. Freedom is therefore no attained state that would set in and end the walking. It is the understood and fostered condition for people’s being able to widen their own scope of action and decision. The consciously and mutually held democratic regulative fiction of individual freedom is not a means to a later end, but the exercise in which freedom is produced, present each time — as the continual widening of precisely these scopes. Whoever waits for the final state has already lost; whoever, in the walking, produces the conditions of mutual adulthood is already, on the way, free and of equal worth.
The task of the democratic opposition is therefore not to bring about a guaranteed end, but to recognize and foster the direction of the development: to bring the advanced net of activities and dependencies, and the lagging disposition that still carries the rigidified image of guardianship, into a tension that resolves in favor of adulthood. This is slow work, for the bond is deeply ingrained on both sides; it never suffices to see through the myth of rule so long as the image of one’s own dependence is not laid aside. But this very work is freedom itself in the carrying-out. Insight into necessity does not mean bowing to a teleological necessity — to the notion of a predetermined goal — but understanding the regularity of the direction of development and clearing the way, in one’s own action, for its steadiness. And on this path, not at its dreamed-of end, the self-governing commonwealth begins.
On the Intellectual Background
The body of the text presupposes no prior knowledge and names no names; the load-bearing thoughts rest on a number of sources, which may be acknowledged here. The notion of posited, consciously held assumptions (“as if”) and their hardening into dogma goes back to Hans Vaihinger; its social development — the communal bringing-forth of what later appears as mere fact — to Ludwik Fleck and to the social-constructionist sociology of knowledge. The thought that there is no “I” in itself, because the bearing word exists only as a pair (I-Thou, I-It), comes from Martin Buber. The web of interdependent human beings, the series of personal pronouns as its model, the balances of power, and the figure of the established and the outsiders, together with the relations of self-worth among individuals and groups — group pride and group disgrace — are taken from Norbert Elias; the civilizational thought, the growth of the capacity for empathy and the widening of the reach of mutual identification beyond one’s own group, from his theory of the civilizing process. The conception of consciousness as an unceasing stream goes back to William James; to it corresponds, in figurational sociology, the remembered continuum of change. That the dignity of every human being is inviolable, and that the human being is always to be treated at the same time as an end and never merely as a means, are here construed as regulative fictions — the first following the first article of the Basic Law, the second following Immanuel Kant. That the democratic struggle is the work of persuasion which overcomes every camp mentality, and that democracy is a form of life that must be learned anew each day, follows Oskar Negt. The sentence that a human being owes the unfolding of his mind more to his enemies than to his friends is, again, Vaihinger’s. The concept of freedom as understood necessity has its older root in Spinoza and in the tradition continued by Hegel and Marx; the lag-effect of the ingrained disposition is developed following Marx.
References
Berger, Peter L. / Luckmann, Thomas: The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Doubleday 1966.
Buber, Martin: I and Thou (Ich und Du, 1923).
Elias, Norbert: The Civilizing Process (Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, 1939).
Elias, Norbert: What Is Sociology? (Was ist Soziologie? 1970).
Elias, Norbert: The Society of Individuals (Die Gesellschaft der Individuen, 1987).
Elias, Norbert / Scotson, John L.: The Established and the Outsiders. London: Frank Cass 1965.
Fleck, Ludwik: Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache, 1935).
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830).
James, William: The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt 1890.
Kant, Immanuel: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785).
Marx, Karl: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).
Negt, Oskar: Der politische Mensch. Demokratie als Lebensform [The Political Human Being: Democracy as a Form of Life]. Göttingen: Steidl 2010.
Spinoza, Baruch de: Ethics (1677).
Vaihinger, Hans: The Philosophy of “As If” (Die Philosophie des Als Ob, 1911).
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949, Article 1(1).
Hanover, 25 June 2026
https://gholamasad.jimdofree.com/
متن انگلیسی نوشته:
Dawud Gholamasad
On the Necessity of Producing Common Sense
On the Differently Constructed Social Facts of the Camps and the Remembered Continuum of Transformation
I.
An earlier essay — “On the Necessity of Relationship Work by the Opposition Groups for the Democratic Overcoming of the Islamic Republic” — showed that part of the opposition’s impotence is self-made. Cooperation fails because understanding fails, and understanding fails because the relational aspect of every message is missed. Its remedy was to turn that relational message around: away from the above-and-below of tutelage and the friend-and-foe of the camps, toward meeting the other as an equal citizen. But beneath this layer lies a deeper one, touched on there yet never fully drawn out — the layer at which what is made is taken for what is given. For the camps do not merely stand in a poisoned relationship to one another. They stand in differently experienced realities. Each carries with it a stock of facts it holds to be simply given, facts on which its very identity rests — and the facts of the one contradict the facts of the other. As long as this is so, even the turned relational message runs into a wall. The dispute cannot be settled on its merits, not only because dignity is at stake, but because there is no common ground of facts on which anything could be settled at all. It is this deeper ground that the present essay pursues, asking how a common ground — a common sense — can be produced.
II.
First one must see what a “social fact” is. There are axioms of belief and value orientations that the individual does not experience as his own opinion, but as something the world simply presents to him: something that was there before him, surrounds him, binds him, and resists him like a reified reality. The language he did not invent; the border of his country; the order of what counts as honorable. Such a reality is made by human beings together, and yet it confronts the individual as an objective given he cannot simply wish away. It is brought forth in shared activity, detaches itself from those who made it, and hardens into something of its own, which then stands before those who come after as a finished order. They find it already there, make it their own, and pass it on — until in the end no one still sees that it was made. This double character — made, and yet experienced as given — was already the root of the first essay: the confusion of the made with the given, the forgetting of the fictional character of such positings. Here it returns on a deeper level. For the most consequential social facts are the facts about who one is and where one comes from — the identity-founding facts.
III.
From where, then, do human beings — as individuals and as groups — take such facts? Not from any sober inventory of the past. And here a misunderstanding must first be set aside, for it slips in all too easily. Neither the individual nor the single group is a self-standing unit. Both are moments of a wider web of interdependence, a figuration. Just as there is no human being apart from his relations to others, so there is no group that could exist apart from other groups, or apart from the human beings who make it up. The individual becomes an individual only among others; the group exists only in the individuals who count themselves part of it — and only in relation to the groups from which it sets itself off. No one has a self that did not take shape in dealings with others, and no group has a substance that is not carried by its individuals and defined over against other groups. Even what one holds, for oneself, to be true and certain becomes clear only in exchange with others. The image one has of oneself begins not with one but with two.
On both sides of this process there is a remembered continuum of transformation, and the two are interlocked. On the side of the individual it is the stream of his consciousness: that ceaseless, never quite resting flow of perceptions, feelings, and memories through which he experiences himself as one and the same “I” across time — a biographical continuum that assures him the person he is today is the same he was yesterday. On the side of the group it is a socially mediated history: the jointly remembered, ordered, and interpreted transformation of the “we,” from which a group of human beings knows where it comes from. And neither is to be had without the other. The individual’s stream of consciousness is steeped from the first in the interpretations of his own people, and the group’s history lives only insofar as individuals take it up into their own stream and carry it on. Both continua, moreover, are not preserved directly but mediated through symbols — through language, images, stories — in which knowledge, memory, and self-interpretation can first be held fast and handed on at all.
This can be set within a larger order. All experience is bound to the forms of space and time — to the three dimensions of space and the one of time — without which nothing could be given to us; they are the condition under which a world is there for us in the first place. But the human being has, beyond these four dimensions, a fifth that no other creature possesses in the same way: the symbolic. He perceives the world not directly but through symbols — through language above all — and only in this symbolic dimension do knowledge, memory, and self-interpretation acquire any permanence. Symbols, in this, are not a veil drawn between the human being and a world already finished in itself; they are the world as it is experienced. What counts to a community as reality is given to it through its symbols, and a different stock of symbols is a differently experienced world. It is here, in the fifth dimension, that social facts and the remembered continuum of transformation have their place. They are not things in space but formations of the symbol — and yet they bind as firmly as any wall. And because the human being commands symbols, he can take a stance toward his own past instead of merely being carried by it.
But how do many individuals become a group? By identifying with one another — through shared, emotionally charged axioms of belief and value orientations. An axiom of belief is a proposition about the world that one no longer tests, because one stands on it: a basic assumption that counts not as an assumption but as self-evident truth. A value orientation is the emotional bond to whatever is to count as good and honorable. Neither is merely known; both are charged with feeling, and it is this affective charge that makes them the bond fusing individuals into a “we.” So the shared axioms and value orientations themselves become social facts — something that confronts the individual as given and binding, though it exists only in the shared assent of the many. That this bond is more than a holding-for-true has a bodily ground: the inner images by which a human being steers himself are coupled to the brain’s centers of arousal, which lend them meaning and feeling. An axiom of belief is therefore no mere thought but an orientation anchored in the body — and that is why to touch it is felt not as contradiction but as threat.
A community, then, does not know from itself who it is. It knows it through the remembered continuity of its own transformations — a history of its becoming, ordered after the fact, selected, and condensed into a single coherent course that runs from a beginning to the present self. This remembered continuum of transformation is the ground of the collective self-image: it says where the group comes from, what it has suffered and achieved, to whom it owes itself, and whom it must beware of. It is no store of past facts but a figure of interpretation, produced ever anew — and just because it is felt as one’s own history, it appears not as interpretation but as fact, as the objective past itself. The identity-founding facts of a camp are thus the hardened deposits of its remembered continuum of transformation, carried by affectively charged axioms and value orientations and taken for given. And because they touch the self-worth from which those who belong draw their security and their pride, they lie deeper than any mere opinion. To touch them is to touch not an opinion but the ground on which the individual stands, both as an individual and as a member of his “we.” And because no group exists apart from the groups it sets itself off from, these founding facts are never drawn purely from the camp itself: they are shaped from the outset against the others, and already carry the others’ negation within them.
IV.
Now the decisive step. One sees now that the mutually exclusive facts of the camps do not arise from each camp shaping its history on its own, apart from the other, so that these finished histories then happen to collide. The exclusion is no later collision; it is the very rule by which these facts are formed. Because each camp becomes a camp only over against the other, its founding fact is shaped from the outset against that other. The one defines itself as the rightful by casting the other as the treacherous; it has its founding deed only insofar as the same deed is, at once, the other’s overthrow or tyranny. So the same event enters the two continua not merely with a different sign but with the opposite one — and necessarily so, for the one sign requires the other. What to the one is the founding deed is to the other the betrayal; what to the one is the golden order is to the other the tyranny; what to the one is liberation is to the other downfall. Each camp draws its group pride from the very fact that shames the other, and so carries the other’s debasement not as an addition but as the reverse side of its own self-assertion.
Here a distinction must be drawn, without which all that follows would go astray. That one grows into a community and learns to look with its eyes does not mean one ceases to see with one’s own. The individual looks with the gaze of his own people — he perceives the world in the forms his community has trained into him — and yet it is still his own eye that sees. In this gap, between the communally shaped looking and one’s own seeing, lies the whole space of freedom. It is why no camp is ever wholly closed: there are always individuals whose own seeing rubs against the trained gaze, who perceive a fact otherwise than the group prescribes. To overlook this is to fall into the most dangerous of all misunderstandings — that common ground might be won by having everyone see with the same eyes. That would not be common sense but enforced conformity. The common ground at issue is not the one gaze to which all must submit, but the ground on which different gazes can stand side by side without having to extinguish one another.
And because each continuum is taken not as one interpretation among several but as the objective history, the camps do not merely judge the same facts differently — they inhabit incompatible stocks of facts. Each sees the world with the trained eyes of its own people, and what the one beholds as fact the other does not behold at all, or beholds as its opposite. Each brings its founding facts to bear against the other, and in doing so throws the other’s founding facts into doubt at the root. This is why the conflict resists settlement on the merits even more stubbornly than the first essay suggested: beneath the conflict over dignity lies a conflict over reality itself. Two who esteem each other differently can still meet on common ground; two who stand in different realities have no common ground on which to meet. The fact of the one is the lie of the other.
V.
Now it becomes plain what is truly missing. What is missing is common sense — and the word must be taken in its full, double meaning. Common sense is, first, the shared sense by which different people recognize the same world as a common one: the capacity to see a fact as a fact that the other, too, can see as a fact. And it is, second, the sense for what is common as such — a concern directed at a good that is not one’s own group’s alone, but that of the common polity in which all stand together. The two meanings are one: only where a common world is acknowledged can a common good be willed. But where each camp inhabits its own constructed reality, both are missing. There is no common world, because each has his own facts; and there is no common good, because there is nothing common in which a good could be shared. Common sense, then, is no natural inheritance the opposition need only recall. It is precisely what it lacks — and what would first have to be produced.
Yet common sense, rightly understood, is not the leveling of difference. It does not ask that all hold the same history true and see with the same eyes; it asks only that different views recognize themselves as views of a common world. And for just this reason it rests on a condition without which it cannot be had: on tolerance. Tolerance is not indifference to truth, nor the lukewarm letting-pass of anything and everything. It is the hard-won capacity to acknowledge the other’s interpretation as a possible interpretation, even where one does not share it — and to know one’s own as an interpretation, not as reality itself. It is the condition of possibility of a democratic polity, for such a polity consists precisely in this: that human beings holding different truths can nonetheless inhabit a common world and will a common good. A common sense without tolerance would be none. It would be the rule of one camp passing itself off as the common — the enforced conformity that destroys the very thing it claims to produce.
VI.
With this it can now be said, positively, what common sense consists in, once it cannot be a single shared world of experience. It consists not in the camps experiencing the same world, but in each recognizing in the other a possible seer of the same world. The worlds of experience remain different; what changes is their relation to one another. As long as a camp takes its own view for reality itself, the other’s view is necessarily untruth. Once it recognizes its own view as a view — as one possible way of seeing the same world — the other’s view can stand beside it as a second possibility, without the first having to give itself up. Common sense is precisely this second thing: not the one world all would experience alike, but the recognition that the different experiences are experiences of a common world.
Yet this common sense does not arise from merely tolerating the other. It arises from the empathic insight that the differing perception of the same event is necessary — necessary because those who perceive come out of different experiences. Whoever has grasped why the other must see the same thing otherwise no longer merely tolerates his view, but understands it as the coherent view of a human being with a different history. And this grasp requires empathy: the capacity to enter into the other’s experience far enough to see how his view follows from it of necessity.
This can be shown in the Iranian process of state-formation. For the centripetal camp, the national unification under Reza Shah was the founding deed of modern Iran — the overcoming of disintegration, the birth of the unified state. But for the non-Persian peoples the same unification was lived as brutality: the suppression of their language, the stifling of their cultural distinctiveness, and beyond that a disparity of development that persists to this day, which left their regions behind while the center advanced. Neither perception is arbitrary; each follows of necessity from the experience of the one who holds it. Whoever holds only his own for true sees in the other a lie. But whoever enters in — whoever follows the suffered oppression and the experience of developmental disparity as a real experience — grasps that the other cannot see otherwise, and that his view strikes the same history, only from its other side.
These opposed perceptions reach into the present, and both harden into a distortion that blocks the view. The centripetal camp reads the self-assertion of the ethnic groups, to this day, as separatism — the will to tear the country apart — and brands them separatists, where in fact they are struggling for language, participation, and regional development. The ethnic camp, in turn, reads the oppression it suffered as oppression by “the Persians,” because Persian was raised to the sole national language while every other language was held down. But both readings miss the same reality. It was not one people that oppressed another: a state apparatus displaced all other languages in the name of a single national one — and to this compulsion toward monolingualism the Persian-speaking people, as people, were no less subject; only their language happened to coincide with the state’s, so that they did not feel the compulsion as such. The equation of the state with a people is, on both sides, the same confusion: the centralist takes resistance to the apparatus for separatism, the ethnic activist takes the apparatus for “the Persians.” Only once this confusion is seen through does it become visible that both alike stood under the same rule — and that here, in a subjection suffered in common under an apparatus that stifled the plurality of languages, there already lies a ground on which the separated experiences can recognize themselves as experiences of a common history.
Here, in this empathic insight, common sense arises — not by one side surrendering its view, but by each grasping the necessity of the other’s.
One sees now that tolerance, rightly understood, is precisely this empathic recognition — not the indifferent letting-pass for which it is so often mistaken. False tolerance tolerates the other by taking no interest in him; it leaves him in his world because nothing about him matters to it. That is no recognition but a polite form of indifference, and it yields no common sense, for it leaves the worlds standing side by side, unconnected. True tolerance turns toward the other. It takes his experience seriously enough to let it count as a real experience of the same world in which I too have a share. It is therefore more demanding than indifference, for it requires holding one’s own view in suspense a while and letting the other’s come near — that shift of the balance toward detachment already spoken of.
For just this reason tolerance has the limit it must set itself. If tolerance is the recognition of the other as a possible seer of the same world, then it cannot recognize the one who denies the common world as such — who steps onto the shared ground only to close it again, and treats the other’s view not as possible but as something to be extinguished. A tolerance that tolerated even this one without limit would abolish itself; it would hand the common ground over to the very people bent on destroying it. Intolerance toward intolerance is therefore no contradiction of openness but its condition. This is no exception to tolerance; it follows from tolerance’s own meaning. Whoever denies the common world places himself outside the very relation that sustains tolerance in the first place.
VII.
And here the argument of the relationship essay is sharpened and carried further. To turn the relational message — to meet the other as an equal — is necessary, but not yet enough; for even equals who stand in different realities have nothing in common to speak about. And every statement about the facts says, at the same time, something about who the speaker claims to be and how he stands to the other. As long as the facts of the camps negate one another, every such statement carries the message that the other lives in untruth; only the jointly built ground draws that message’s sting. Beyond the relational message, then, lies the harder task: to produce the common ground of facts on which alone a common world, and with it a common sense, can stand. This ground cannot be decreed — one cannot order human beings to hold the same facts — and it cannot be presupposed, the way the centripetal side presupposes a nation that does not yet exist. It can only be produced, and it is produced by building a common remembered continuum of transformation: a history of a common becoming, written together against each side’s own myths, in which events no longer enter with opposite signs but in a single course that all can acknowledge as their own. This is the deepest layer of the confidence-building measures. Where two peoples who had done terrible things to one another — as the Germans and the French — sat down together to write their shared history anew, they did not merely defuse a threat; they produced a common remembered continuum of transformation where before there had stood two hostile ones, and with it the ground of a common sense.
But how is such a ground built, when every word about the facts still carries the old message that the other lives in untruth? Here the very manner of speaking must change. It makes a difference whether I say “this is how it was” — and so declare the other’s history a lie — or whether I say what I perceived, how it was for me, what I need and what I ask. The first kind of speech asserts a fact against the other; the second conveys an experience the other cannot dispute, because it is mine. Whoever speaks of his own perception and his own need instead of the other’s offense draws the sting from what he says without giving up the matter itself — and opens for the other the room to do the same. Part of this is respecting the other’s thresholds of pain: those points in his remembered history where the memory of suffered harm sits cannot be torn open unguarded without the old threat returning at once and closing understanding again. So, out of a contest of two truths, there comes an exchange of two experiences — and only along this path can a common history be written at all.
But this succeeds only if those involved practice in themselves that balance of involvement and detachment of which the first essay already spoke. As long as one is wholly gripped by his own cause, he takes his image of the past for the past itself, and can hear the other’s history only as a lie. Only the step back — shifting the balance a little toward detachment — lets him recognize his own interpretation as an interpretation, and makes him able to let the other’s stand beside it. This capacity, as was shown there, is no merely personal gift but a civilizational trait, formed in long processes of learning, which an opposition that means to clear the way for democracy must foster in itself. Nonviolent speech and practiced detachment are thus the two tools by which the common ground can be built at all.
And because the exclusion was itself relationally formed — because each camp drew its dignity from negating the other — its overcoming cannot be a mere setting of the histories side by side. The jointly built continuum changes not the past but the relation in which those involved stand to it and to one another: it rebuilds the relationship so that no one need any longer draw his self-worth from the other’s debasement. In this, the common continuum does not extinguish the individual histories, any more than the encompassing “we” extinguishes the smaller we-bonds. It fits them into a continuum wide enough to bear them — so that the remembered history of, say, the Kurd and that of the Persian, of the believer and of the secular, no longer negate one another as rival objective pasts, but stand side by side as several strands of a common becoming. This is the memory-side of what, on the side of institutions, the principle of subsidiarity accomplishes: the many find their place within the one, without the one extinguishing them.
VIII.
With this, the producing of common sense proves to be a political task in the full sense. Democratic politics was defined as the democratic production and operation of the general conditions of society’s reproduction. Among these conditions, one is the most inconspicuous and at the same time the most fundamental: the production and maintenance of the common world itself. It is the shared ground of acknowledged facts and the shared sense, without which no society can reproduce itself as one. The producing of common sense is therefore no soft accessory to politics, but a piece of its core — the subjective counterpart to the common conditions of reproduction.
And it belongs to democratization, once this is understood as a directional process. For democratization shifts not only the balance of power but the balance of experienced reality: away from the many closed continua of the camps, toward an open, shared continuum. In this continuum no camp’s past is decreed as the objective one, and none is silenced. Precisely in this — that it is open and not decreed — lies the difference between common sense and its counterfeit: the open continuum holds the difference of views within it, the decreed one erases them.
Here too the way is the goal. Whoever begins to write his history together with the other is already practicing the common world he seeks to reach. But this succeeds only on one condition: that one is able to see one’s own history also from the other’s perspective.
IX.
With this, the various aspects of the civilizing process that this essay has touched enter into a single connection. Seen rightly, they were moments of one and the same process: the even tempering of the affects, through which practiced self-steering takes the place of an external constraint that has become self-constraint; the shift of the balance of involvement and detachment a little toward detachment — without the rationalization of experience it brings, no one recognizes his own interpretation as an interpretation; the widening range of identification of human being with human being beyond one’s own group — from the neighbor to the fellow citizen and, at the furthest reach, to the human being as human being; the practiced understanding of the stranger, which lets empathy ripen into tolerance; and the growing mutual interdependence that not only makes all this possible but compels it. These aspects do not stand side by side like separate teachings; they are the facets of one and the same directional civilizing process, whose subjective counterpart is the producing of democratic common sense.
A scientifically grounded politics does not invent this direction; it recognizes it. It distinguishes the backward-looking diagnosis of what had to become from the forward-looking prognosis of what can probably become, and it reads in the development its directionality — toward a denser interweaving of relationships, more tempered affect, a widened range of people’s identification with one another. But here the decisive point must be held fast: social processes are not natural processes. In nature there are laws that cannot be suspended; in social life there are only regularities. A regularity is no law — it holds as long as the figuration that bears it holds, and it dissolves when that figuration changes. Precisely for this reason social processes are reversible. The directional process of democratization is neither guaranteed nor impossible; it can be fostered, and it can be thrown back. Precisely because it is reversible, it demands that one hold it to its direction. This keeping of directional constancy is the proper task of a politics that understands itself as a science: to recognize the direction and to uphold it against the ever-present possibility of relapse — relapse into the siege mentality, into ethnicization, into the rigidified complementarity behind which stands the lag of the social habitus.
From this follows something the opposition readily forgets. The overcoming of the Islamic Republic does not begin with its overthrow. Democratization is no event that sets in on the day the existing rule falls; it is a directional process of power balances shifting in favor of the weaker at every level of social life — a process either practiced now or never set in motion at all. Whoever waits for the overthrow to begin the civilizational work will, the day after, repeat the old complementary relation of tutelage under new colors — the toppled guardianship returning as a new one. The overthrow is only the visible political moment; the overcoming is the institutionalization of the shift of balances, which must already be under way. This is why the opposition has to take up civilizational tasks now, in its present standing as opposition, before it holds any power at all — and these tasks are the very stuff of its own democratization.
Within Iran, they are the following. First, to lead the ethnicized and confessionalized conflicts back from the level of identity to the level of the matter itself — to the distribution of resources, to recognition and democratic participation in shaping the general conditions of society’s reproduction — because matters can be talked over, whereas the other’s belonging to the common society cannot. Second, to address the believers, the hesitant, even the regime’s adherents as future equal fellow citizens rather than as enemies, and so to widen the “we” instead of sealing it at the borders of one’s own camp. Third, to build up, from below, the subsidiary self-organizations of civil society, in which the symmetrical relation among equals is actually practiced — the long march through the civil-society organizations, in which democracy is practiced as a form of life before it can become a form of state. Fourth, wherever there is room for it, to begin the shared work on the common remembered continuum of transformation — the work of overcoming the ethnicization of the common history, which leads the hostile camps out of their several myths. And fifth, to cultivate in oneself the tempering of affect and the shift of the balance toward detachment and, with the rationalization of experience and the capacity for self-reflection that come with it, to practice that nonviolent understanding which makes it possible to speak of one’s own and the other’s perceptions rather than of the other’s offense, and which in doing so respects the other’s thresholds of pain.
Outward, in the diaspora, the tasks are these. The groups in exile must first live out among themselves the common sense they demand for the homeland: to practice the alliance across the camps’ borders that is not yet possible at home, and precisely not to carry the ethnicization and confessionalization of the conflicts into exile and there intensify them. They must undertake, among their own organizations, the confidence-building measures — shared forums, shared accounts — instead of fighting one another as true and false opposition. Outwardly, they must represent not the fragment but the future common “we” of all citizens. And they must resist the temptation to put outside pressure, or even war, in the place of the inner civilizing process. For an overthrow brought about by foreign force is not the overcoming of the existing rule, and a democracy cannot be installed from without — it is a directional process whose direction can only be fostered from within and held to its constancy.
So the argument of the relationship essay is carried beyond itself. To turn the relational message opens the door; to produce common sense — the shared reality and the shared sense — builds the room behind it; and to practice both now, in the position of opposition, is already the beginning of the overcoming itself. For because the directional process is reversible, its direction is decided not on the day of the overthrow but in every way the camps deal with one another already today. The producing of common sense is therefore the work that an opposition must labor at if it means not only to overcome a rule, but to found the common world of a commonwealth of citizens come of age — knowing that it must not wait for this work until that rule has ended.
References
Bauer, Joachim: Wie wir werden, wie wir sind. Die Entstehung des menschlichen Selbst durch Resonanz. Munich: Blessing 2019. — Berger, Peter L. / Luckmann, Thomas: The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Doubleday 1966. — Elias, Norbert: The Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. Rev. ed. Oxford: Blackwell 2000. — Elias, Norbert: What Is Sociology? New York: Columbia University Press 1978 (especially chapter 5). — Elias, Norbert: The Symbol Theory. London: Sage 1991. — Fleck, Ludwik: Erfahrung und Tatsache. Gesammelte Aufsätze. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1983 (English essays in: Cognition and Fact. Materials on Ludwik Fleck. Dordrecht: Reidel 1986). — Gholamasad, Dawud: On the Necessity of Relationship Work by the Opposition Groups for the Democratic Overcoming of the Islamic Republic. Hanover 2026 (available at gholamasad.jimdofree.com). — Hüther, Gerald: Die Macht der inneren Bilder. Wie Visionen das Gehirn, den Menschen und die Welt verändern. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2004. — James, William: The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt 1890 (on the stream of consciousness and habit). — Kant, Immanuel: Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998. — Moeller, Michael Lukas: Die Wahrheit beginnt zu zweit. Das Paar im Gespräch. Reinbek: Rowohlt 1988. — Rosenberg, Marshall B.: Nonviolent Communication. A Language of Life. 2nd ed. Encinitas: PuddleDancer Press 2003. — Schütz, Alfred: The Phenomenology of the Social World. Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1967. — Schulz von Thun, Friedemann: Miteinander reden. Störungen und Klärungen. Reinbek: Rowohlt 1981. — Vaihinger, Hans: The Philosophy of ‘As If’. London: Kegan Paul 1924.
Hanover, 2 July 2026
https://gholamasad.jimdofree.com/